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INTRODUCTION: PROTECTING THE INDIVIDUAL OR THE GROUP?

American jurisprudence is frequently criticized for its preoccupation
with rights and for what one commentator, Mary Ann Glendon, calls its
"legalistic
character,
its
exaggerated
absoluteness,
its
hyperindividualism, its insularity, and its silence with respect to
personal, civic, and collective responsibilities."' American law is
condemned for its anti-social nature. Or, to put it another way, the
American legal system is known for protecting the individual and not the
group.
The Supreme Court, as the supreme expositor of American law, takes
the lion's share of the blame for this tendency. Legal scholars T.A.
Aleinikoff and Samuel Issacharoff, in their assessment of the
controversial decision in Shaw v. Reno,' offer a representative criticism
I. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE, at x (1991). The emphasis on individualism is widely supposed to derive
from the myth of the independent yeoman. Thus, J.G.A. Pocock, whom Glendon cites in
this regard, asserts that "[t]he point about freehold in this context is that it involves its
proprietor as little as possible in dependence upon, or even in relations with, other
people, and so leaves him free for the full austerity of citizenship in the classical sense."
J.G.A. POCOCK, POLmcs, LANGUAGE AND TIME 91 (1971). As far as the point about
dependence goes, Pocock is correct, but he is wrong to suggest that freehold was
supposed to discourage relations with others.
The independence of the freeholder, in American legal lore, was supposed to render
him ideally suited to participate in civic life. It was thought to give him an interest that
originated in his holding but transcended it. A good summary of this idea was given in
the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1829-1830 by Philip N. Nicholas, a banker
from Richmond:
Ask one of our freeholders whose man he is, he will tell you he is his own
man .... Do you believe, Mr. Chairman, that there is any property which
attaches a man so much to the country as the land? There is none. His
attachment to his home, is connected with the best sympathies of the human
heart .... He will love his county which contains a home so dear to him, and
defend that country at the hazard of his life.
DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY: THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF
THE 1820's, at 393 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1966).
2. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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of the Court for paying attention to the "equal treatment of individuals
rather than the raising up of disadvantaged groups."' In a similar vein,
Glendon criticizes the Court for its decision in Hodel v. Irving,' which
struck down a Congressional reassignment to the Oglala Sioux tribe of
lands previously owned by individual members of the tribe.' To
Glendon the case reveals the "extreme vulnerability of communities to
individual rights on the one hand, and to imperatives of the [S]tate on
the other."6 Another author, Aviam Soifer, concurs in this judgment,
writing that in Hodel the "right of the individual had to prevail, almost
by definition, over all competing considerations, whether utilitarian or
rights-based. " 7
The charge that American law is preoccupied with individualism does
not stop at the Supreme Court, nor is it restricted to the present. Many
commentators contend that this exclusive dedication to individual rights
stretches far beyond the Court-that it bespeaks a systematic deficiency
in American law and legal theory. Soifer writes that the problem lies at
the heart of American law: "[T]he American legal system lacks any
theory to handle groups. The dominant legal paradifm in American law
is the relationship between individual and [S]tate." Glendon likewise
complains that "groups or associations that stand between the individual
and the [S]tate all too often meet with judicial incomprehension."9
Glendon states Poletown's case in terms of "the interests of
3. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting:
Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 600 (1993).
4. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
5. Under the Dawes Allotment Act of 1887, tribal lands were distributed to tribe
members in the belief that private ownership would make the Indians "civil" and
promote assimilation. See generally JANET A. McDONNELL, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN (1991). Inheritance over the succeeding generations made individual
holdings smaller and smaller, and Congress moved in 1983 to consolidate the small
holdings and return them to the tribes. One tract of land owned by members of a Sioux
tribe, described as "one of the most fractionated parcels of land in the world," boasted a
forty-acre parcel owned by 439 people. See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 713. Two-thirds of these
people received less than one dollar per year in rent, and the other third less than five
cents. See id.
6. GLENDON, supra note I, at 114.
7. AVIAMS0IFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 84 (1995).
8. Id. at I.
9. GLENDON, supra note I, at I 14-15. Glendon criticizes the infamous decision
in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), in a
similar fashion. In this case, the court upheld a taking by the City of Detroit of land
subsequently conveyed to General Motors. The taking was held to have a public purpose
because it was effected in contemplation of increased employment in the area. See
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
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communities." She laments that its residents-because of ostensible
defects in American rights-talk-"could not find a way to communicate
effectively" about shared interests that stood apart from their individual
property rights."
Further, critics maintain that American law has shown a similar
disregard for the group throughout American history. Despite the many
labors of civic republicans in the law schools and history departments,
the prevalent impression is that the United States has been devoted to the
interests of the individual from its earliest days. Thus, Glendon, who
agrees with Soifer on the current state of affairs, traces this concern with
the individual to the founding of the republic: "In the beginning, that is,
at the Founding, there was no particular reason for American statesmen
to pay special attention to families, neighborhoods, or other small
associations.
These social systems were just there, seemingly
'natural' .... " 12 Legal historian Stanley Katz agrees, contending that the
federalism of the Constitution embodies a liberalism prevalent at the end of the
eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, which was concerned principally
with individuals and with rights: "life, liberty, and property," in John Locke's
famous formulation, or the right to pursue that form of social peace and
prosperity that the eighteenth century referred to as "happiness. " 13

Here Katz provides a convenient formulation that blends liberalism,
rights, and the Constitution in defense of the proposition that the nation
has been attentive to the rights of the individual from the very first.
There are not many voices on the other side. Most notably, political
theorist Barry Shain has denounced what he terms the "Myth of
American Individualism," contending that American political thought is
based on Protestant communitarian values rather than autonomous
individual values." Legal scholar John Garvey has argued at length that
theories of individual autonomy do not adequately explain why or how
we should protect freedom." Otherwise, there is not much in the
GLENDON, supra note I, at 110.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 115.
Stanley N. Katz, The Legal Framework of American Pluralism: Liberal
Constitutionalism and the Protection of Groups, in BEYOND PLURALISM: THE
CONCEPTION OF GROUPS AND GROUP IDENTITIES IN AMERICA 11, 12-13 (Wendy F. Katkin
et al. eds., 1998).
14. See generally BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM:
THE PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (] 994).
15. See generally JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FoR? (1996). Garvey
addresses this Article's concerns most explicitly in chapter eight (Groups) and chapter
nine (Churches). See id. at 123-38, 139-54. In particular, Garvey argues against the
individualist explanation and justification for group action and protection. ''The
dominant school of thought about this problem maintains that group action has value
because it is an aggregate of valued individual actions." Id. at 133. Although he does
10.
I I.
12.
13.
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scholarly world to undermine the notion that American law has
historically been committed to the individual at the expense of the
16
group.
But is the indictment of American jurisprudence for an undue concern
for the rights of the individual well-founded? This Article argues that it
is not. Commentators have been able to claim that American law favors
the individual rather than the group only because they have ignored the
group that the United States has traditionally championed: the
corporation. If anything, American jurisprudence is hyper-corporate
rather than hyper-individualistic. While critics impugn American legal
culture for its anti-social tendencies and for its failure to protect the
group, the group has actually enjoyed extraordinary protection
throughout the course of American history.
American society and law display a deep reverence for the group, as
long as it assumes corporate or quasi-corporate form. This reverence is
not fleeting; rather, it has deep historical roots. In fact, it was there
before the republic came into being and it played a profound role in the
founding of the nation. Moreover, these roots are not only traditional,
but philosophical and religious as well.
This Article explores those roots, with three goals in mind. First, to
correct the mistaken notion that American law has historically
demonstrated a commitment to the individual at the expense of the
group, and to suggest how this critique should be restated. Second, to
re-evaluate modem cases that are often thought to stand for expressions
of individual rights, as cases actually protective of group rights. Third,
to contend that American reverence for the corporate form explains why
America's favorite group---the corporation-came to be as powerful as
it is today."
not deny that some organizational behavior is properly understood in such terms, Garvey
insists that we must remember that much group activity can be understood only in terms
of collective interests and goals, which are not identical with those of the individuals
who compose the group. See id. at 138 ("We value actions by the group because they
accomplish these interpersonal goals, or promote these goods.").
16. Aviam Soifer occupies an unusual place in this debate. Although he maintains,
as noted in this Article, that American law is dedicated to the relationship between the
State and the individual-at the expense of intermediate groups-he implies that there is
a marked need for an account of groups in American history. See SOIFER, supra note 7,
at 73 ("Moreover, the absence of a sense of history remains one of the most noteworthy
and most troubling aspects of recent treatment of groups in legal scholarship as well as at
the highest levels of United States and English judge-made law.").
17. The legal history of the corporation has never been seriously and
systematically examined. The common wisdom is that the power of the American
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Parts II and III of this Article establish the importance of the
corporation in revolutionary America by comparing the fate of the
corporation in the French and American Revolutions." Parts IV and V
continue by analyzing one of the most important and most neglected
subjects in the legal history of the new republic: the early nineteenthcentury controversy over the incorporation of churches. 1' In Part VI, this
Article first shows that an understanding of the corporate underpinnings
of our jurisprudence calls for a re-evaluation of cases commonly
believed to vindicate the rights of the individual. Then it returns to the
critics of the supposed American individualism, arguing that their
criticisms need to be redrawn so as to recognize the corporate character
of the law.
The "sanctity of association" is not just a phrase. It describes a
commitment to joint action whose significance for modem and historical
law has passed almost unnoticed. An appreciation of this sanctity has
corporation is the result of a series of perfidious dealings-sometimes described in terms
of collusion between businessmen and judges-which began around the time of the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and which were distinctly on-American.
This Article challenges that assertion. arguing that the power of the corporation
derives in large part from the American predisposition toward associations.
Individualism was not at the center of political and legal theory in colonial and
revolutionary America. Rather, in theory and in practice Americans thought in corporate
terms; the eighteenth-century American intellectual heirs of John Locke, like Locke
himself, were champions not of a neutral individualism, but of a corporate liberalism.
For the use of this phrase with respect to the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, see generally R. JEFFREY LUSTIG, CORPGRATE LIBERALISM: THE ORIGINS OF
MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY, 1890-1920 (1982).
18. In both practice and theory, the French were hostile toward corporate life while
Americans proved, generally, to be hospitable. See infra Parts II-III.
19. This issue is important because it shows that when Americans had to resolve
the most difficult kind of problems, they quickly turned to corporations. Moreover, in
the life of the churches, as in that of the nation, the Revolution led to a struggle between
democratic and hierarchical social ordering. The history of religious incorporation thus
provides a Jens through which to view the dilemmas confronting the new republic and it
illustrates vividly the fact that the new nation had committed itself at a very early date to
allowing small republics to dwell within its borders-borders both geographic and legal.
Part V concludes by arguing that the incorporation of churches was the first step in a
general relocation of sovereignty in corporations. General incorporation of religious
societies paved the way for general incorporation of business societies and, as the
century progressed, legislatures announced that people did not need the permission of the
sovereign-Le., the Legislature-to form corporations. Originally, corporations could
form only with the permission of the monarch, as granted in a special charter. Special
incorporation was eventually replaced in most states by general incorporation, which
allowed incorporation on a much more widespread basis. Courts obliged the corporators
as well. From the time of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518 (1819), well beyond Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118
U.S. 394 (1886), the constitutional law of corporations took deep breaths of American
political theory. In the process, the corporation became a person. Although many
contend that this was only an artificial person, the Jaw resorted to artifice because it
found itself dealing with a distinctive and collective moral being. See infra Part V.
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two lessons to teach: one about the present and one about the past.
Constitutional law cannot be fully understood without reference to
enduring moral postulates on the importance of association. Because we
have focused on the individual rather than the corporation as the bearer
of rights, we have misconceived the nature of the liberty that is protected
by American law. The historical significance, which is highlighted by
the experience of the churches, is that it is wrong to believe that the
Founders committed the new nation to pure individualism-and thus to
neutrality-in such important matters as religion. In practice, the nation
committed itself to freedom as conceived in a Christian and Protestant
light. This was freedom defined within corporate bounds, that is to say,
a freedom based on widely-shared moral understandings. Moreover, the
modern tendency to discount the influence of religion on the American
past has led us to miss the important role of churches in the growth of
general incorporation and thereby to forget the undeniably "moral"
origins of the corporation.
II.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND CORPORATE LIFE

Why tum to the French Revolution in an Article about corporatism in
the United States? One reason is that the French republican approach to
the corporation is strikingly different from the American approach and
thus provides an instructive contrast.
The common view is that the United States is so hostile to groups that
it tends to wear away their very identities over time. As Soifer puts it,
"Much law is devoted to macadamizing and pulverizing,"20 by which he
means that American law puts inordinate pressure on groups. Yet it was
the French Revolution, rather than the American, that showed
unremitting hostility toward the corporation. The theory and practice of
French anti-corporatism will help put American attitudes into
perspective.
Critics of the American approach often show an affinity for European
alternatives and seem especially beguiled by French ways. They have
been quick to point to the efforts of European nations, notably France,
for commendable examples of group protection. 21 Glendon prefers
20. SOIFER, supra note 7, at 137.
21. Other scholars have noted a tendency on the part of legal theorists and
historians to look abroad for theories to explain American political and constitutional
life. See, e.g., I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 5-6 (1991); Martin
S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
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Rousseau, the philosopher of the French Revolution, to John Locke,
comparing the Genevan favorably to "the stolid English and Scottish
writers of 'republican' persuasion for whom private property was the
necessary base for the virtuous independent-minded citizen. "22 Professor
Frank Michelman approves of "the modem republican commitment to
social plurality" 23 and of the Western philosophical tradition celebrating
"values that are communal and objective."24 He finds these values in a
tradition that stretches from Aristotle through Rousseau to Kant." Cass
Sunstein, in arguing for a diversity-enhancing approach to education that
corresponds to the position of the antifederalists, notes a similarity
between "the antifederalists' views and those of Rousseau."26 Elsewhere
he lauds the governments of France, Germany, Italy, and Britain for
promoting "high-quality broadcasting"" and the German Constitutional
Court for promoting diversity on German television." Akhil Amar, in
arguing that the Bill of Rights actually does protect the rights of groups,
relies on Rousseau to help make the point.29
523, 529-35 (1995).
22. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 32.
23. Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1532-33 (1988).
24. Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination:
Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 150
(1977-1978).
25. See id. In drawing this single line, Michelman forgets that French thought on
the character of civic personality was quite different from American. Thus, he cites
Hannah Arendt's On Revolution for her "stunningly expressed commendations of
freedom as 'public happiness."' Id. at 152 n.30. Yet in hoping to find a style of thought
that applies to American constitutional practice, he does not see the difference between a
French approach to sovereignty and an Anglo-American approach. Arendt, however,
was quite aware of the difference, noting that
just as Montesquieu's theory of the separation of powers had become
axiomatic for American political thought because it took its cue from the
English constitution, so Rousseau's notion of a General Will, inspiring and
directing the nation as though it were no longer composed of a multitude but
actually formed one person, became axiomatic for all factions and parties of
the French Revolution, because it was indeed the theoretical substitute for the
sovereign will of an absolute monarch.
HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 155 (1963).
26. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV.
29, 36 n.31 (1985) ("Similarities between the antifederalists' views and those of
Rousseau are readily apparent. Surprisingly, however, Rousseau's name seldom
appeared in the antifederalist literature and is mentioned only once in The Complete
Anti-Federalist.").
27. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 80 ( 1993).
On the subject of the popularity of Jerry Lewis movies in France, Sunstein maintains a
dignified silence.
28. See id. at 77-79.
29. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
26 (1998), which states:
The right of the people to assemble does not simply protect the ability of selfselected clusters of individuals to meet together; it is also an express
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A study of French approaches to incorporation argues strongly that it
is wrong to look overseas for the best examples of group protection. The
phrase "macadamizing and pulverizing" comes from the medieval
historian Maitland, who used it to call attention to a very strong
tendency on the part of the French to pulverize groups smaller than the
State. Indeed, Soifer credits Maitland fully for his insight, asserting that
"it was Maitland who led the brigade of the leading English legal
scholars to urge the ubiquitous reality and vital importance of group
entities."'° In fact, in his writings Maitland contrasted the United States
with France, pointing to the United States as a land in which group
personality was finding a home in law. 31
Maitland's insight was extremely important, but its significance has
not been fully appreciated. Others have been sensible of a distinction
between France and America on the notion of a "general will," but
Maitland traced the operation of the unitary will to a general theory
hostile to the corporation and trust. When he sought an example of a
legal culture that was hostile to groups, he turned to France. Conceding
that England was itself heading in the French direction and noting that
Hobbes thought of corporations----organized groups within the State-as
"troublesome entozoa,"32 Maitland cautioned that it was in France rather
than England where "we may see the pulverizing, macadamizing
tendency in all its glory ... reducing to impotence, and then to nullity,
all that intervenes between Man and State." 33
reservation of the collective right of We the People to assemble in a future
convention and exercise our sovereign right to alter or abolish our government.
In the words of Rousseau's ... social contract, "the sovereign can act only
when the people are assembled."
Id. (quoting 3 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT SOCIAL CH. XII (1762)) (emphasis
added).
30. SOIFER, supra note 7, at 73.
3 I. See FREDERICK w. MAITLAND, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, in
MAITLAND: SELECTED ESSAYS 223, 229 (H.D. Hazeltine et al. eds .• 1936).
32. Id.
33. Id. Maitland is introduced here for several reasons. The first is that his work
suggested the approach that this Article takes. The second is that he saw quite clearly,
long before others, that the problems involved in respecting corporate rights-"group"
rights-pertain to many sorts of corporate entities, and that to solve them requires some
understanding of what constitutes group personality.
Are corporations merely fictional persons? To answer that they are is to subscribe to a
doctrine of utility that has never been fully accepted in the United States, although courts
have often said that they are. For if the State creates the corporate entities that live
within its borders, it may dismantle them at will. Maitland's essential point in this
regard is that in both England and the United States there are a great many corporate
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He was right.
With a clarity and ferocity not to be found in
revolutionary America, spokesmen for French nationhood made clear on
many occasions that true liberty was expressed in the direct relationship
between the individual citizen and the nation. It had little room for
intermediate bodies larger than the natural individual but smaller than
the State.
A.

The French Revolution and the Attack on Corporations

The French did not mince words. On August 18, 1792, the National
Assembly decreed that a "State that is truly free ought not to suffer
within its bosom any corporation, not even such as, being dedicated to
public instruction, have merited well of the country."" On the basis of
this absolutist doctrine regarding corporate life, the French government
reached into facets of life that the American government has rarely
presumed to reach. By 1792 some very un-American things had been
justified by this line of thought.
As everyone knows, the French Revolution established the nation as
the protector of the individual and the enemy of privilege based on
tradition.'• The Declaration of the Rights of Man begins with the
promise that "Men are born, and always continue, free and equal in
respect of their rights. Civil distinctions, therefore, can be founded only
entities organized to different ends, and that an answer meant to decide a question with
regard to profit-making concerns may just as well implicate religious bodies.
One of the important implications of his observation is that those who would protect
"group" rights are going to have to consider that opposing interests may have excellent
claims of their own to recognition as a group. Another is that adherents of group
protections, though they may either deny or fail to realize it, will often argue on some
premise of natural law. What is it, for instance, that privileges the integrity of the racial
group over that of the State? The answer is trickier than many care to acknowledge.
Moreover, Maitland observed that a theory of corporate rights cannot confine itself to
the ordinary rubrics of law. As has been said above, modern analysts tend to want to
protect the "social" claim of the group against the property claim of the individual.
Maitland knew that no such division could be made easily, and that groups claimed to
own property just as individuals did. Thus, he reminded his readers that the debates of
the French Revolution on the ecclesiastical settlement were about property as well as
status; in fact, his studies lead us to say that the two are always found together. See id. at
230. The question, "Who owes this debt to the nation?" is closely related to the
question, "Is this entity a juristic person?"
34. Maitland moved on to note that the ownership of other property was open to
the same attack that succeeded against the church. If the State was a "real" person who
could take property from "artificial" persons such as the church, other corporate
individuals had to worry at the example: "And as with the churches, the universities, the
trade-gilds, and the like, so also with the communes, the towns and villages." Id. at 230.
35. Id. at 229-30.
36. See JOHN MCMANNERS, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE CHURCH 25 (1969)
(explaining revolutionary policy regarding the Catholic Church in "light of the attack on
privilege which was the driving force of the Revolution").
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on public utility ," 37 The body to decide questions of public utility was
the "Nation," considered in the third article of the Declaration to be
"essentially the source of all sovereignty."''
France had moved very quickly to give legal expression to its theory
of corporations. On November 2, 1789, the National Assembly passed
an act confiscating the lands held by church corporations; from then on
39
all such property was to be "at the disposal of the nation." The nation
would, in turn, pay for the support of the clergy and for the maintenance
of religion. Although the Declaration provided for the protection of
property,'° the fate of the church showed that no similar protection was
to be afforded to corporations. This corporate insecurity had been hinted
at in the statement that "civil distinction," i.e., inequality, could be
sanctioned only for reasons of "public utility."
Soon after its property was sacrificed on the altar of national
necessity, the Catholic Church lost control of its own workings. The
constitution of the French Church itself was changed by the Assembly,
which passed the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in July of 1790. 41
Aside from providing for the election of bishops and priests, the Civil
Constitution took a further remarkable step: it decreed that papal
pronouncements of any kind were no longer to have any force "unless
they have been presented to the legislative body, seen and verified by
it."42 Papal documents were not even to be distributed, read, or
published until they had been sanctioned by the Assembly.
This system of censorship is instructive because it sharpens the
distinction between an individual liberty and a group liberty. The
Declaration had promised that because the "unrestrained communication
of thoughts and opinions [was] one of the most precious [r]ights of
37. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS BY THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY OF FRANCE ( 1789), reprinted in REVOLUTION FROM 1789 TO 1906, at 30, 30
(R.W. Postgate ed., Harper & Brothers 1962) (1920).
38. Id.
39. DECREE CONFISCATING CHURCH LANDS, NOVEMBER 2, 1789, reprinted in
REVOLUTION FROM 1789 TO 1906, supra note 37, at 32, 32.
40. The last article upheld the right to property: "The right to property being
inviolable and sacred, no one ought to be deprived of it, except in cases of evident public
necessity, legally ascertained, and on condition of a previous just indemnity."
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF
FRANCE, supra note 37, at 3 I.
4 I. See THE CIVIL CONSTITUTION OF THE CLERGY (1790), reprinted in THE
CONSTITUTIONS AND OTHER SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF
FRANCE 1789-1907, at 16, 16 (Frank Maloy Anderson ed., 2d ed. 1908).
42. Id. at 23.
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[m]an, every citizen may speak, write, and publish freely, provided he is
responsible for the abuse of this liberty, in cases determined by the
law.'"'' It was made obvious that this protection did not extend to
corporate communications. Thus, it is striking that the revolutionaries
promised an "unrestrained communication" at the same time they aimed
to restrict the kind of corporate speech that the Pope engaged in.
Such anti-corporate actions were premised on the belief that the nation
ought to exercise a general superintendency over all the groups within its
44
borders. The opportunistic cleric, Talleyrand, insisted that property
belonging to clergymen was different from other property because it was
intended for a function, rather than for the enrichment of individuals."
Even if the nation did not have the right to destroy the whole body of the
clergy, Talleyrand believed that the State was entitled to "destroy
particular aggregations of this corps if it judges them harmful or simply
useless.'""' Talleyrand went further still. Not only did the nation, by
right, have control over the property belonging to religious bodies, it
possessed "a very extended empire over all corporate bodies existing
within its confines.'"'' It was equally true that the "Nation, for the very
reason that it is protector of the wishes of the founders, can, and even
must, suppress benefices that have come to have no functions.'"''
Talleyrand explained at some length just how extensive the authority of
the State was to be:
One is always correct in saying, in ordinary language, that the properties
were given to the Church: which has never meant anything, if not that these
properties have been, to the discharge of the State, destined for the use of
religion, the maintenance of the temples, the relief of the poor, and, finally, for
works of public benefit, and they must always fulfill this intended objective.
One is also correct in saying that they were given irrevocably; ... they are
irrevocably assigned for this purpose, whatever fate may befall the particular
corps they were assigned to at first. ...49

Talleyrand thus made his stand on the use to which the property could be
applied, but he did not appear to quibble with the idea that the nation
0
was entitled to enforce these uses. '
43. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS BY THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY OF FRANCE, supra note 37, at 31.
44. McManners explains that Talleyrand, in going along with the attack on church
properties, was "planning a political career based upon collaboration with the
inevitable." McMANNERS, supra note 36, at 27.
45. See Talleyrand on Ecclesiastical Property, in THE FRENCH REVOLUTION l 13,
114-15 (Paul H. Beik ed., 1970).
46. Id. at 115.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 116 n.l (emphasis added).
50. This Article does not mean to suggest that there was no disagreement on such
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The treatment of the Catholic Church in the French Revolution
illustrates a thorough contempt for corporations in general, and the
attack on corporate activity reached far beyond the church. In June of
1791 the Assembly passed a law restricting association of laborers.' 1
The first article of the French Constitution laid out its anti-corporate
premise explicitly: "[the] destruction of all kinds of corporations of
Citizens of the same status and profession being one of the fundamental
bases of the French Constitution," they were no longer to be tolerated."
It is tempting to think that the French were merely abolishing
outmoded associations so as to bring the nation into the next century. It
is difficult to take issue with the Constitution of 179 I in its desire to
eliminate "irrevocably the institutions that have injured liberty and the
equality of rights."" The Constitution seems equally reasonable as it
notes that, according to this desire, the Assembly has abolished the
nobility. 54
Yet the anti-corporate tendency becomes more obvious as the
Constitution observes that associations of professions have been made
unlawful and that the "law no longer recognizes religious vows, nor any
other obligation which may be contrary to natural rights or to the
issues. In the debate on the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, for instance, the
Archbishop of Aix reproached the revolutionaries for usurping a spiritual jurisdiction.
Christ had not assigned the maintenance of the spiritual life to magistrates, but to the
Apostles and their successors: "Jesus Christ gave his mission to the apostles and their
successors for the well-being of the faithful; he entrusted it neither to magistrates nor to
the king: his concern was an order in which magistrates and kings must obey." 6
H!STOIRE PARLEMENTAIRE DE LA REVOLUTION FRANCAISE, Ou JOURNAL DES
ASSEMBLEES NATI6NALES, DEPUIS 1789 JUSQU'EN 1815 11 (Paris, B. Buchez & P. Roux
eds., 1834) [hereinafter H!STOIRE PARLEMENTAIRE] ("Jesus-Christ a donne sa mission
aux apotres et a ses successeurs pour le salut des fideles; ii ne !'a confiee ni aux
magistrats, ni au roi: ii s'agit d'un ordre de choses dans lequel !es magistrats et !es rois
doivent obeir."). In the same debate, one M. le cure le Clerc contended that the spiritual
power belonged to the church, and that it was imprescriptible: "The powers of the church
are inalienable and imprescriptible; their essence is divine: she may thus exercise them in
all their independence." Id. at 19 ("Les pouvoirs de l'eglise sont inalienables et
imprescriptibles; leur essence est divine: elle peut done !es excercer dans toute leur
independance. ").
51. See LAW OF JUNE 14, 1791 ON ASSOCIATIONS, reprinted in REVOLUTION FROM
1789 TO 1906, supra note 37, at 37, 37.
52. Id. The greatest failure of the United States to allow freedom of association, of
course, comes in the area of labor.
53. CONSTITUTION OF 1791, reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS AND OTHER SELECT
DOCUMENTS lLLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF FRANCE 1789-1907, supra note 41, at 58,
61.
54. See id.
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constitution."" This mistrust of associative activity is made still more
clear by the provision for freedom of petition because the guarantee
applies only to the individual: the citizen enjoys "[l]iberty to address
individually signed petitions to the constituted authorities."06 Persons
gathered in assembly do not enjoy the right.
The attack went further still. Workers' corporations (i.e., labor
unions) had been prohibited by the Decree for Reorganizing the Local
Government System, passed in December of 1789." Citizens were to
meet in assemblies and it was provided that the assemblies were to form
themselves not "by crafts, professions, or corporations, but by quarters
or districts."" The law on association stipulated that "[c]itizens of a like
calling or profession, employers, shopkeepers, workers and
journeymen . . . shall not, when they shall meet together, name a
president, or secretaries, or syndics, nor keep registers, nor pass
resolutions or make decisions, nor form regulations for their so-called
common interests.""
It is evident from all this activity that there was a principle at work,
one that made for a persistent theme in French history. The French were
to restrict association, particularly religious association, for more than a
hundred years to come. The Law of Associations, passed in 1901,
provided that "[n]o religious congregation can be formed without an
authorisation given by a law which shall determine the conditions of its
operation.""' Congregations already in existence that failed to meet the
requirement were to be dissolved, their property to be liquidated in
court. 61
To the question of the proper place of the corporation in a republic,
the French had given a resoundingly clear answer. The French
Revolution was a program designed to reeducate persons into citizens
and to reconfigure corporations into units serviceable to the republic.

55.

56.

Id.
Id. at 62.

57.
DECREES FOR REORGANIZING THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM, reprinted in
THE CONSTITUTIONS AND OTHER SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF
FRANCE 1789-1907, supra note 41, at 24, 25.
58. Id.
59. DECREE UPON THE ORGANIZATION OF TRADES AND PROFESSIONS (1791),
reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS AND OTHER SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE
HISTORY OF FRANCE 1789-1907, supra note 41, at 43, 43.
60. LAW OF ASSOCIATIONS, reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS AND OTHER SELECT
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF FRANCE 1789-1907, supra note 41, at 659,
660.

61.

114

See id. at 661.

[VOL. 37: 101, 2000]

Corporation in American Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

B.

Rousseau: Association, Republicanism, and the Citizen

Why was this their response? The answer is that there was a theory
underlying the practice: that only the nation and the citizen possessed a
civic personality. The revolutionary Thouret put it most succinctly in
declaring that because "the suppression of a corporation is not murder[,]
the revocation of a corporation's right to possess the funds of the land is
not a theft." 62 In other words, a corporation is not a person and thus was
to be subjected to the "general will," which was the only force that could
"effect the destruction of everything.""
He thus appears to leave the individual, whose destruction is murder,
secure in the possession of his property. The individual, it appears, is a
"natural" individual, a person protected in all that is his by the
increasingly "natural" state. Thouret' s reference to the general will was
itself a recapitulation of a much lengthier formulation by Rousseau, who
had insisted that the maintenance of the "general will" depended on the
direct relation between the individual and the State, unmediated by
corporate entities. 64 As far as Rousseau was concerned, a government
that presided over associations was one that could not give voice to the
general will; if "the general will is to be truly expressed," he wrote, "it is
essential that there be no subsidiary groups within the State, and that
65
each citizen voice his own opinion and nothing but his own opinion."
This mistrust of corporate activity can be translated directly into a
66
dislike of society itself. Rousseau was not consistent in his feelings
toward society, but he evinced deep doubts about the benefits that it
conferred. Society appears to be little more than a collective illness in
some of his writings: "[O]ne is strongly inclined to believe that the
history of human illnesses could easily be written by following that of

62. HENRI HA YEM, LE DROIT DE PROPRIETE ET SES LIMITES 196-97 (I 910) ("la
suppression d'un corps n'est pas un homicide," "la revocation de la faculte aux corps de
posseder des fonds de terre ne sera pas une spoliation.").
63. Id. ("[!]! n'y a que la volonte publique qui puisse operer la renonciation de
tous .... " ).
64. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in SOCIAL
CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU 167, 194 (Ernest Barker ed. &
Gerard Hopkins trans., 1948).
65. Id.
66. Rousseau's attitudes varied over time, and some of his writings are more
amenable toward society. Yet it is still safe to say that the society of which he approves
is closely regulated by a central intelligence, and that it is not characterized by
autonomous associations.
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civil societies."" Association denatures man, with terrible results, for
"[i]n becoming sociable and a slave he becomes weak, fearful, [and]
servile. "68 In his more extreme statements Rousseau took aim at
cooperation itself: "[F]rom the moment one man needed the help of
another ... equality disappeared, property was introduced .... " 69
His solution to the problem is what sets Rousseau apart from his
American contemporaries: it is to make the representative superior to the
constituent. What was needed, he claimed, was a sovereign author who
would prevent the evils of association.10 He made this point most
dramatically in his essay on the theatre, which emphasized the
importance of authorship in overcoming the debased condition of
society. 11 Having explained the deleterious influence that immoral
theatre exerts on a society, he contended that the proper function of
drama was moral education." How could this be done by actors who
were themselves no better than the people they were to educate? It was
certain that "[ w]e will, then, at first have bad actors, and we will at first
be bad judges. Will they form us or will we form them?""
The danger to public morals was so great, he insisted, that the only
remedy was for the State to write the plays: "[The solution] is, in order
to make the dramas of our theatre suitable to us, to compose them
ourselves; we should have authors before we have actors." 14 If we were
to translate this into a maxim of republican political life, we would say,
"Authorities come before constituents."
III. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE PuBLIC CORPORATION

A.

The Colonial Beginnings of Corporate Culture

"We are a company," declared Governor John Winthrop in the famous
speech he delivered as he and a shipload of fellow Puritans sailed from
England to found a religious commonwealth in New England in 1630."
In using the word "company" Winthrop was probably speaking
67. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of
Inequality Among Men (Second Discourse), in JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE FIRST AND
SECOND DISCOURSES 77, 110 (Roger D. Masters ed., Roger D. Masters & Judith R.
Masters trans., 1964).
68. Id. at Ill.
69. Id. at 151.
70. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, POLITICS AND THE ARTS: LETTER TO M.
D' ALEMBERT ON THE THEATRE 119-20 (Allan Bloom trans., 1968).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
75. SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, BUll.DERS OF THE BAY COLONY 72-73 (1930).
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informally, but it is true that Massachusetts was not only a company of
Christians but a corporation as well." Winthrop continued by explaining
the Christian purpose of the enterprise in republican terms, cautioning
that "the care of the publique must oversway all private respects.""
Such attention to the general good was necessary to ensure "that
ourselves and posterity may be the better preserved from the common
corruptions of this evil world.""
Winthrop and his company were launching an early English corporate
republican venture in the New World, but it was not the only one. To
the south lay Virginia, a colony that had also begun its life as a
corporation and was at the same time a small nation. 79 English colonists
had begun a venerable tradition in which corporators dedicated their
property and their labors (or the labors of others) to a public purpose.
Their early endeavors also led to a threefold legacy that was to endure
long after the American Revolution: a dogged insistence on the rights of
the people rather than the rights of the person, a habit of federated
government, and a firm belief in a Providential social contract. This last
point may be the most important because it is the least understood.
Modern commentators assume that social contracts are premised on a
rampant individualism. However, the contracts that colonial Americans
liked to cite were contracts between a people, such as the people of
Massachusetts Bay, and a ruler, such as God or a monarch.8°
These agreements were much more explicitly religious in seventeenthcentury New England than in other times and places, but when the
Stamp Act prompted the colonies to begin declaring their rights in the
mid-l 760s, they did not waste their time on theories involving individual
social contracting; instead they emphasized the various agreements that
the English monarch had supposedly entered into with his English76. As Robert Cover puts it, "Perhaps the most compelling historical example of
the use of private law in the generation of a nomos was the creation of a polity out of the
corporate charter of Massachusetts Bay." Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 31 (1983).
77. MORISON, supra note 75, at 73.
78. Id.
79. Colonial Virginia is often thought to be utterly unlike colonial Massachusetts,
in that Virginia was devoted exclusively to profit, whereas Massachusetts dedicated itself
to the promotion of religion. For a very effective statement of the position that Virginia
was also interested in religious advancement, see PERRY MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE
WILDERNESS 99 (1956).
80. On the extremely complicated subject of the various covenants in which the
Puritans believed, see PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY 365-462 ( 1954).
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American peoples." To demonstrate the religious character of American
liberty at length would go beyond the bounds of this Article, but it must
be noted because it accounts for much of the communal content of
American liberty as well." It can hardly be denied that Revolutionary
ideology retained Protestant overtones, at the very least."
How can this corporate Protestant ideology be reconciled with the
individualistic philosophy of John Locke?
Given the obvious
indebtedness of the founding generation to John Locke and his
reputation as a proponent of a neutral individualism, it is necessary to
emphasize that he was closer to Governor Winthrop's views than we
now think. Thomas Jefferson, for instance, thought of Locke in the
company of republicans such as Sidney.84 He was not an individualist in
any modem sense, and his constitutional thought was largely religious in
origin. Locke has an undeserved reputation for individualist thought
because we have focused on the wrong part of his story." Modem
commentators have been impressed, favorably or not, with the fact that
Locke devoted much attention in the Second Treatise to the activities of
individuals in a state of nature. Gordon Wood, for example, writes that
Locke's social contract is "not a governmental contract between
magistrates and people, rulers and ruled, but an agreement among

81. For documents emanating from the Stamp Act, see generally PROLOGUE TO
REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764-1766
(Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959). For an excellent assessment of the controversy over the
Stamp Act, see generally EDMUND s. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT
CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION (2d ed. 1962).
82. For an extended argument on the religious character of American corporatism
and for a denial that American political thought is individualistic, see generally SHAIN,
supra note 14. Although Shain exaggerates the religious dimension, he provides a
wealth of evidence showing that the role of religion has been underestimated in
understanding the nature of theories of American freedom.
83. See EDMUND s. MORGAN, THE CHALLENGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 88
(1976).
84. "When Jefferson refers to Locke's politics, he links him, not with Bacon and
Newton, but invariably with Sidney." GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 17] (I 978).
85. See SHAIN, supra note 14, at 191-92. Shain explains that Locke's belief in
independence does not translate into anything like modern individualism. According to
Locke, he writes, a man "was free when he was allowed to participate in the shaping of
the laws that would bind him." Id. at 191. This contrasts with the individualism of John
Stuart Mill, who believed
that all societal limitations that go beyond the similar protection of other
autonomous individuals, whether tacitly consented to or not, were repressive
and illegitimate.
In this sense, Americans in the 18th century may have been Lockean, but
this does not mean that they understood personal or familial independence in a
modern individualist fashion any more than Locke likely did.
Id. at 192.
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isolated individuals in a state of nature to combine in a society.""
Glendon likens Locke's man in a state of nature to that of Hobbes,
because what they share is solitude: "Locke's man, too, was a loner.""
Because he begins with individuals and the property they accrue in a
state of nature, Locke is held to be a proponent of individualism.
What we often forget is that the actual aim of the Second Treatise was
to defend the rights of the people against a greedy monarch. Locke's
individuals did not stay in a state of nature for very long. They quickly
associated so as to protect a corporate right against encroachment by an
individual. Thus, he maintained that "when the government is dissolved,
the people are at liberty to provide for themselves ... for the society can
never by the fault of another lose the native and original right it has to
preserve itself."" The Second Treatise is actually anti-individualistic in
that it takes the most powerful individual in the land and makes him a
mere trustee of a corporate good.
Moreover, although Locke did offer a secular justification for popular
sovereignty, his message was distinctly religious in two senses. The
Second Treatise was written because of the conflict between James II
and his Protestant subjects. The rift had developed in large part because
of the belief that James intended to make England Catholic." The
original enemy of a Protestant people had been the Pope, but several
Stuart monarchs had made themselves (at least as many of their subjects
saw the matter) into allies of the Pope and thus into enemies of the
Protestants.9° The Second Treatise was meant to weigh in on the side of
Protestantism as one of the rights of a free people.
Locke's argument is also explicitly religious. A glance at the Second
Treatise shows that arguments about the state of nature are liberally
complemented with Biblical proof. The famous argument on property,
for instance, begins with an appeal to both reason and revelation.' 1
86. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at
283 (2d ed. 1998). Wood maintains that Americans relied on this formulation
increasingly in the years after 1776. See id.
87. GLENDON, supra note I, at 68.
88. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT§ 220, at 123 (Thomas
P. Peardon ed., 1952).
89. See EDMUND s. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 100 (1988).
90. See id. at 100-17.
91. See id.§ 25, at 16. Locke stated:
Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us that men, being once born,
have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat [sic] and drink and
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Because Locke was arguing against the theory that the monarch held his
position by virtue of divine right, this religious emphasis makes sense.
As Edmund S. Morgan has shown, the triumph of popular sovereignty
meant that the divine right of monarchs was replaced by the divine right
of the people; thinkers such as Locke played an important part in the
transition.' In the process, they did not exclude God from political and
legal theory so much as re-identify the earthly agent through whom He
manifested His will-the collective entity known as "the people.""
A final point, coming from Locke's involvement in colonial affairs,
helps to correct the common misconception regarding the kind of society
and government he favored. He is well known for the declaration that
"in the beginning all the world was America."" This statement conjures
an image of a multitude of possessive individuals acquiring property in a
state of nature; however, the plan of government that he designed for
these wilds had a distinctly feudal flavor."
The Fundamental
Constitutions that he drafted for the Carolinas in 1669 provided that a
hereditar~ nobility would own two-fifths of the land in the new
colonies. 6 The members of this class would also compose the upper
house of the Legislature and would propose legislation to the lower
house, which would vote on acceptance but would not be able to
amend." Such a plan was obviously premised not on any theory of the
primacy of the individual, but on a theory that sought the common good
by balancing the various parts of the State. Locke was a republican, as
Jefferson maintained, although his republicanism had an aristocratic
flavor to it.

such other things as nature affords for their subsistence; or revelation, which
gives us an account of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to
Noah and his sons; it is very clear that God, as King David says, "has given the
earth to the children of men," given it to mankind in common.
Id. (quoting Psalm 115:16).
92. See MORGAN, supra note 89, at 119-20.
93. Id. at 267. Thus, Morgan maintains that James Madison "invented" an
American people in order to make up for the deficiencies of a national government
hamstrung by state sovereignty:
To that end he envisioned a genuine national government, resting for its
authority, not on the state governments and not even on the peoples of the
several states considered separately, but on an American people, a people who
constituted a separate and superior entity, capable of conveying to a national
government an authority that would necessarily impinge on the authority of the
state governments.
Id.
94. LOCKE, supra note 88, § 49, at 29.
95. See id.
96. See MORGAN, supra note 89, at 129.
97. See id.
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B.

The American Revolution and Individualism

The preoccupation with group rights that characterized both the early
history of the colonies and the political thought that colonists read made
itself evident in the American Revolution.
Locke's linking of
individualism with tyranny, and the coupling of his constitutional theory
with religious belief, was reproduced in the American colonies at the
time of the Revolution. Thus, the Reverend Samuel West emphasized,
in a sermon given in Boston in 1776, that a claim made by a
representative and collective body against an individual was
presumptively legitimate:
If it be asked, Who are the proper judges to determine when rulers are guilty of
tyranny and oppression? I answer, the public. Not a few disaffected
individuals, but the collective body of the [S]tate ... for, as it is the collective
body that invests rulers with their power and authority, so it is the collective
body that has the sole right of judging whether rulers act up to the end of their
institution or not. ... [T]he public is always willing to be rightly informed, and
when it has proper matter of conviction laid before it its judgment is always
right.98

West's argument here is very similar to Locke's, and it is also the
argument made in the Declaration of lndependence~that a sovereign
individual who engages in "a long train of abuses" must be made to pay
the price by the people who suffered at his hands:• This emphasis on
association was to be affirmed repeatedly in the practices of the
revolutionaries. Although the colonies began modestly with their
assemblies, in just a few years associations, congresses, and conventions
besieged the new nation.
The next two decades would show that locating this people, this
"collective body of the State," was more difficult than it sounded
because there was no single body of the State. It was a federated body,
and just as federalism had formed an essential part of the argument
against British measures such as the Stamp Act and Sugar Act, so it
would influence the political life of the new nation. In the end, many
federated bodies would emerge, and the corporation would be among
them.
98. SAMUEL WEST, ON THE RIGHT TO REBEL AGAINST GOVERNORS (ELECTION DAY
SERMON) (Boston 1776), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE
FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, at 419, 423 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds.,
1983).
99. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); LOCKE, supra note
88, § 225, at 126.
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C.

A Corporate Political Theory for the New Nation

The great driving engine behind the corporatism of American politics
was federalism, for it was a truism that a national representative
assembly had to provide for a variety of local interests. The colonists
who had opposed British measures in the 1760s and 1770s had insisted
that the Empire was a federation, and they did not retreat from their
belief in federation after the Revolution. The interplay between the
national government and the states is one of the fascinating features of
early national life. The First Continental Congress of 1774 was brought
into being, as Edmund S. Morgan observes, by "regular colonial
assemblies, by extralegal provincial congress, [and] by committees of
correspondence." 100 In tum, the Second Congress announced that each
colony was a "free and independent state." 101
Americans, attached to their notions of federalism and separation of
powers, were committed to the idea that there had to be counterbalancing corporations within a well-governed nation.
Thomas
Jefferson, who was among the most French of the Founders, was hostile
to granting privileges to what we now would call "private"
10
corporations. Yet he believed that it was the essence of the union to
have federated bodies within the frame of a national government. In his
first inaugural address he proclaimed: "We are all republicans-we are
103
federalists." French republicans could not have said the same.
Indeed, French republican theory held that there was a national
supremacy over all the bodies within the nation 104-a belief antithetical
to Jefferson's assertion that the United States government enjoyed only
those limited powers conferred by the states. He wrote that their
"association as a nation was only for special purposes ... and the states
composing the association chose to give it powers for those purposes
[and] no others." 105 The national government could not legitimately
"adopt any general system, because it would have embraced objects on
which this association had no right to form or declare a will. " 106
Likewise, Jefferson denounced the view that deposing the King had
thrust America back into a state of nature. He objected to this "Vermont
100. MORGAN, supra note 89, at 263.
IOI. Id.
102. See GORDON s. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 320
(1992).
103. THOMAS JEFFERSON, FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS (1801), reprinted in THE
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 290, 292 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
104. See supra Part II.
105. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 18, 1799), in THE
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 103, at 479, 482.
106. Id.
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doctrine," according to which the people of Vermont claimed that the
Revolution had freed them from Massachusetts by returning everyone to
a state of nature; he denied that "on changing the form of our
government all our laws were dissolved, and ourselves reduced to a state
101
of nature."
The removal of the sovereign, King George, did not
impinge on other items on which the people had agreed when they made
the social contract: "For my part, if the term social contract is to be
forced from theoretical into practical use, I shall apply it to all the laws
obligatory on the [S]tate, and which may be considered as contracts to
108
which all the individuals are parties."
The abrogation of certain
articles of the contract, he contended, did not render the others invalid. 109
Jefferson's denial that the Revolution abolished all "municipal laws"
provided an acknowledgement of the authority of the various municipal
110
entities to make those laws, an acknowledgement that Rousseau could
not have made. It also amounted to a tacit statement that theories about
a state of nature would not easily be manipulated into justifications for
the rights of individuals to begin making all social arrangements anew;
those individuals were still fixed within their various regulating bodies
and they were not going to escape merely because Americans had
111
deposed the King.
John Adams argued still more vigorously that the nation's authority
112
had to be reposed in local bodies.
The Frenchman Turgot had
criticized America for following English custom in dividing power
113
among various organs of govemment.
French doctrine required a

107. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (Feb. 15, 1783), in 6 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 21 MAY 1781 TO 1 MARCH 1784, at 246, 247 (Julian P.
Boyd ed., 1952).
108. Id. at 248.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Cf SHAIN, supra note 14, at 95. Barry Shain argues that in late eighteenthcentury America "autonomy and self-government were goals most appropriate to
communities, or at the very minimum, to the family. They were clearly not appropriate
goals for individuals." Id. He also asserts that "Revolutionary-era Americans' distrust
of the socially unbounded individual is further evidenced in their attitude toward the
self." Id. at 100.
112. See generally JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITIJTIONS,
reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 105 (George A. Peek, Jr. ed.,
1954).
113. Turgot was famous for his condemnation of associations in France. See 2
OTTO GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY: 1500 TO 1800, at 166
(Ernest Barker trans., 1958).

123

11

unitary authority. ' But where was this authority to be found, Adams
wondered? The theory was nonsensical, he maintained: "It is easily
understood how all authority may be collected into 'one center' in a
despot or monarch; but how it can be done when the center is to be the
nation is more difficult to comprehend." 11 '
Adams believed that Turgot was identifying the nation with its
representative assembly and hence elevating the representative above the
constituent. Was the Frenchman asserting that the nation's "assembly
should be the center in which all the authority was to be collected and
11
should be virtually deemed the nation?" ' Adams thought so. He
devoted an entire work to refuting what seemed to him a dangerous
117
doctrine.
It would not do to identify the constituency with a majority
of its representatives; the way to avoid that identification was to preserve
the integrity of the various bodies that composed the nation.
If we imagine Adams responding directly to Rousseau, he would have
explained that sovereign actors must tell the authors what to write. The
doctrine of federalism, which preserved the powers of the states and in
its extreme form even made them supreme over the national
government, was the most forceful expression of this belief. Although
such a theory is not a call for the kind of general incorporation that was
to sweep the nation in the nineteenth century, it could easily become
one.

D.

The General Will and the Municipal Association

Indeed, it is clear that the theory went beyond a federalism that merely
required the federal government to show respect for the states. One of
the most notable translations of American theory into practice was the
influence that the towns had in the years following the Revolution. The
saga of the adoption of the Massachusetts Constitution demonstrates the
existence of a more general rule regarding the power and authority
wielded by smaller corporate units in dealings with larger ones. 11 ' There
may be no finer illustration of the difference between the French and
American scenes. These corporate bodies retained an influence out of
proportion to their numbers and, by presuming to instruct the state
governments, they insisted that the corporate constituent was superior to
11
the representative. ' In contrast to France, where the general will
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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See supra Part II.
ADAMS, supra note 112, at 123.
Id. at 124-25.
See id.
See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
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created the corporation, the opposite was true in America. 120
Equality of representation was one issue on which the towns showed
their power. The commitment to equality of representation on an
individual basis, which was overriding in France, did not dominate the
121
American scene.
Thus, when the Legislature of Massachusetts
authored its constitution at the end of the I 770s, the question arose as to
how an equitable representation might be achieved.
The state
convention explicitly denounced a plan that would ignore traditional
corporate rights, giving equal weight to each person. Corporate towns
already in existence would have to be represented:
Representation ought to be founded on the Principle of equality; but it cannot be
understood thereby that each Town in the Commonwealth shall have Weight
and importance in a just proportion to its Numbers and property. An exact
Representation would be unpracticable even in a System of Government arising
from the State of Nature, and much more so in a state already divided into
nearly three hundred Corporations. 122

Massachusetts was not to cast itself back into a rational pursuit of a
perfect but impracticable justice, a pursuit that would require it to ignore
rights that towns had acquired prescriptively.
Even the smallest towns demanded representation, and they generally
considered the members of the state legislature as deputies who ought to
follow instructions. 12' Further, they explicitly denied any direct relation
between the state government and the individual. 124 As the town of
Lincoln contended, the State was "Constituted of a great number of
Distinct and very unequal Corporations which Corporations are the
Immediate Constituant part of the State and the Individuals are only the

120. The subsequent history of the municipal corporation suggests that it did not
maintain its constitutive integrity. As John Garvey and Rick Hills note, cities are
generally supposed, at law, to be subordinate to the states. See GARVEY, supra note 15,
at 225; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free
State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201,
1206-30 (1999).
121. Equality of representation was quite important in American affairs, but it did
not achieve the total victory that it did in France.
122. ADDRESS OF THE CONVENTION, MARCH 1780, reprinted in THE POPULAR
SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY: DocUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION
OF 1780, at 434,438 (Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin eds., 1966) [hereinafter POPULAR
SOURCES].
123. See Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin, Introduction to POPULAR SOURCES, supra
note 122, at 42.
124. See id. at 45.

125

Remote parts in many respects."'" This is the doctrine of federalism, but
applied against the state government by the smaller municipal
corporations. It mirrors arguments made on behalf of state governments
that the national government should not interfere directly in the affairs of
the individuals who live in the states. 126
The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution recognized the entitlements
claimed by the towns, providing for compromise in the question of
apportionment but reserving to the towns the right to amend in the
future. 127
The constitution went further still, tacitly likening
Massachusetts itself to the smaller corporations within it. Government
was nothing more than "a voluntary association of individuals: ... a
social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen,
and each citizen with the whole peog,le, that all shall be governed by
certain laws for the common good." ' In this respect the corporation
was quite similar to the State-it was merely a voluntary association of
individuals. This fundamental likeness between the corporation and the
government was to unleash, in the following century, such furious
corporate activity as the world had never before seen.
IV. INCORPORATION AFTER THE REVOLUTION AND THE CHURCHES

The Revolution had barely ended when the demand for private
incorporation began to explode."' In the years to come the presumptive
legitimacy of the public corporation also attached itself to the private
association. The state legislatures, which now held exclusive rights to
incorporate, a power once held by the monarch, handed out corporate
charters with abandon. " 0
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. Thus Madison, in listing objections to the Constitution, noted the fear that the
federal government would govern the people in the states directly: "This one tells us that
the proposed Constitution ought to be rejected, because it is not a confederation of the
States, but a government over individuals." THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 237 (James
Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1964).
127. See Handlin & Handlin, supra note 123, at 50. The constitution struck a
balance between individual and town representation on this point. The vote to amend
appears to have required a two-thirds vote by the population of the state. The voters
were to be convened, in the first place, according to the towns they lived in.
Representatives of the towns were to do the actual business of amending. See THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1780, reprinted in POPULAR SOURCES, supra note 122, at 441,471.
128. THE CONSTITUTION OF I 780, supra note 127, at 441.
129. See OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN EcONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861, at
106-33 (1969); Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation,
50 WM. & MARY Q. 51, 51 (1993).
130. See Maier, supra note 129, at 5 I. Gordon Wood notes that the numbers of
charters issued rose at a very high rate:
The states issued 11 charters of incorporation between 1781 and 1785, 22 more
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Why did this happen? As Pauline Maier observes, this is "[o]ne of the
great unanswered questions about the American Revolution." 131 There
are undoubtedly several reasons, but one is the American fondness for
association coupled with an attachment to the principles of federation,
which led increasingly to the exercise of public powers by corporate
bodies that were not themselves governments. 132 To put it another way,
the spirit of the Massachusetts town became the spirit of the nation. 133
Private groups came to wield enormous power in part because the
government was unable to wield them effectively, and in part because
they seemed to have a greater entitlement. Thus, just as the state
governments passed on the business of business to the corporation, so
they passed the businesses of education and religion to corporations as
well.
Though American culture is famous for its individualism, the most
notable feature of the American landscape after the Revolution is the
emergence of societies. The first enterprises dedicated to improvements
in farming, each styled the "Society for the Promotion of Agriculture,"
were founded in South Carolina, New York, Massachusetts, and
Connecticut between 1785 and 1792. 134 In 1787 the "Philadelphia

between 1786 and 1790, and 114 between 1791 and 1795. Between 1800 and
I 8 I 7 they granted nearly 1,800 corporate charters. Massachusetts alone had
[30] times more business corporations than the half dozen or so that existed in
all of Europe.
WOOD, supra note 102, at 321.
131. Maier, supra note 129, at 51.
132. Maier mentions a very similar explanation, without endorsing it:
For contemporaries, the proliferation of corporations could signal, in effect, an
extension of American federalism down into day-to-day, local associational
relationships, so that "the whole political system" was "made up of a
concatenation of various corporations, political, civil, religions, social and
economical," in which the nation itself was a "great corporation,
comprehending all others."
Id. at 82 (quoting Corporations, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICA 547, 547 (F. Lieber ed.,
1836)).
133. Maier argues that Massachusetts was exemplary in its treatment of the
corporation. "If there is a key to the corporation's popularity, it must lie in the history of
New England and particularly of Massachusetts." Id. at 53. While this Article agrees
that Massachusetts was very important-as the treatment of the Massachusetts towns
indicates-the example of the churches, discussed infra Part IV, argues that
Massachusetts by itself cannot explain the remarkable American attitude toward
corporate entities.
134. J. FRANKLIN JAMESON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION CONSIDERED AS A SOCIAL
MOVEMENT 51 (1940).
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Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons" was founded. 135
Many other little societies dedicated to undeniably social causes sprang
up, even though they did not call themselves "societies"; eight years
after the end of the war the number of colleges in the country had nearly
doubled, from nine to seventeen. 136
Most importantly, Americans formed religious societies. Churches
led the way in the move from incorporation by special charter to general
incorporation. The first general incorporation act was passed in South
Carolina in 1778, the next in New York in 1784, and another in
Pennsylvania in 1791. 137 General incorporation for businesses did not
come until later."' New York provides an instructive contrast between
the business and the church corporation because, even as late as 1821,
the state constitution permitted incorporation for non-religious purposes
only after a two-thirds vote of each house. 139
The history of church incorporation also reveals some of the most
important ways in which political theory has connected with legal reality
in the United States. The churches provide a direct comparison with
France. Their experience affords microcosmic views of the legal and
constitutional problems still to be faced by the young nation. Was the
country going to be run on the basis of aristocratic or democratic
principles?"" What was the proper extent of religious freedom, and how
was it to be implemented? These questions were faced by the national
and state governments, and by the religious corporations as well.
The issue of church incorporation also reminds us that the meaning of
the constitutional guarantees respecting freedom of religion were not
nearly as settled at the time of the Founding as we are inclined to
believe."' By comparing the moral issues of religion with the legal
question of incorporation, the religious example helps us understand the
bounds of freedom and diversity in the new republic. A constitutional
Id. at 76.
See id. at 82-83.
See William G. McLoughlin, The Role of Religion in the Revolution: Liberty of
Conscience and Cultural Cohesion in the New Nation, in ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN
135.
136.
137.

REVOLUTION 197, 215-16, 235, 243-44 (Stephen G. Kurtz & James H. Hutson eds.,
1973).
138. See WOOD, supra note 102, at 321; McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 244.
139. See Maier, supra note 129, at 76.
140. For the argument that corporations were aristocratic and hence at odds with the
nation's democratic ethos, see id. at 61-62, 66-68.
141. For a prominent statement of the belief that the Founders and contemporary
religious sects favored religious exemptions, and that therefore the Constitution should
be construed to favor exemptions, see generally Michael W. McConnell, The Origins
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409
(1990). For an alternative statement of the history of the First Amendment religion
clauses, see generally Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious
Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992).
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commitment to freedom of conscience and disestablishment left many
practical legal issues unresolved. Should denominations be allowed to
incorporate? Should they want to incorporate? If religions were to
become corporations, who would be the incorporators?
Would
management of these corporations be monarchic, aristocratic, or
democratic?
More generally, the problem posed by the churches demonstrates that
in these early republican days Americans sought to vindicate the most
important of their rights not as individuals, but as groups. The history of
the churches provides a clear example of the tendency of American
society to use the corporation as the primary vehicle to realize public
goods, and they remind us that scores of organizations of all kinds were
coming into being at the same time. The universities and colleges that
began to crowd the American landscape, many of them representative of
denominational aspirations, 142 as well as myriad business ventures and a
host of other associations, all serve as evidence of this instinct to
associate.
Finally, given the inevitable desire to generalize American legal
experience, it is essential to note that diversity of response was a
distinctive feature of American attempts to respond to the problems
presented by religious freedom. Federalism required that the states
remain free to devise their own solutions to the problems posed by
religious liberty, for the First Amendment bound only the national
government. Although state constitutions commonly promised religious
freedom, they did not typically explain just what that entailed. Thus, a
diversity of responses was inevitable almost from the start.
A.

Virginia Rejects Incorporation

The first issue to be addressed in the incorporation controversy was
whether to allow incorporation of religions at all. Virginia, which had
an established Anglican Church until the Revolution, is the state whose
approach to religion was most French. 143 In 1776 the Legislature began
142. For a perceptive evaluation of the spread of the college as an instance of
American localism, see DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL
EXPERIENCE 160 (1965) ("The distinctively American college was neither public nor
private, but a community institution. In America it was of a piece with the community
emphasis which already distinguished our civilization.").
143. This Article focuses on several states as a representative sample: Virginia,
Massachusetts, and New York. It also makes passing reference to other states.

129

to debate the issue of disestablishment; by 1779 the Anglican Church
144
had lost the right to tax in support of ministers.
A statute of 1784
allowed the incorporation of denominations but it was repealed in
1786. "' The An?.lican Church-now the Episcopalian Church-lost its
legal personality. 46
There were two arguments against incorporation: First, that the State
did not have the authority to grant privileges to particular
denominations, even if the privileges were made widely available."'
Second, voluntary organizations such as religious groups did not need
148
state recognition.
The opponents of incorporation, notably the
Baptists, sought not only to prevent the future evils that they believed
would result from incorporation but to make up for those from the past
as well.
Disestablishment was just a happy first step for those subscribing to
either of these arguments, and critics of the Anglican supremacy insisted
that the church should not be left in possession of property that it had
received from the colonial government before the Revolution. 149 One
petition insisted that the lands
which were procured at the expense of the Community in general, appears to us
ought to be considered under our present happy constitution, as the Publicks at
large and as Such ought to be put to any use ... that our Honorable Legislature
Shall think proper, to promote the wellfare of this State. 150

In 1802, the petitioners got their wish when the Legislature deprived
the Episcopal Church of its glebe lands."' The constitutionality of the
act was affirmed in 1802, albeit by the barest of margins."' Virginia had

144. See McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 218.
145. See id. at 233.
146. See id. at 233-34.
147. McLoughlin writes that
it is not surprising that radical pietists and deists saw in a general-incorporation
system precisely the same specter of state encroachment upon religious liberty
and the beginnings of a new league between rulers and priests; they did not
believe that incorporation was permissible even upon individual choice. No
religious group had the right to enslave itself to or seek special privileges from
the [S]tate.
Id. at 232.
148. See id. at 233.
149. See id.
150. H.J. EcKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA 122 (1910).
151. See id. at 147; McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 233-34. The church was
allowed to keep lands obtained since 1777. See ECKENRODE, supra note 150, at 148.
152. Chancellor George Wythe dismissed a request for injunctive relief against the
operation of the act, and the case was appealed. Edmund Pendleton, noted for his
support of the church, died shortly before the case was decided, and the court was
deadlocked, two to two. Thus Wythe's decision stood. See EcKENRODE, supra note 150,
at 148-49 (discussing Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call.) 113 (1804)).

130

[VOL. 37: IOI, 2000]

Corporation in American Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

followed the French example insofar as deprivation of property was
concerned.
Yet the state did not follow the French further. Virginia did not, like
France, claim a general superintendency over the religious affairs of the
disestablished church or of any other church."' Instead it showed that
American constitutional doctrine could create real difficulties for the
very societies it intended to help.
By following an early and severe version of the state action doctrine,
Virginia made church societies in general unknown to the law. The state
would not endorse any religion, and it left the authority of their church
governments entirely dependent on the voluntary obedience of church
members. 154
This suited the Baptists, who were known as
"voluntaryists"; that is, they thought that membership in a church and
adherence to a faith should be completely voluntary matters in which the
governments, and their courts, should not be permitted to meddle."'
Other denominations were not as happy with the denial of
incorporation. The Episcopal Church found not only that it had been
deprived of the property at issue in its contest with the Baptists, but that
in the process it had become virtually unknown to the law. Thus in
Turpin v. Locket,"' which upheld the dispossession of church lands,
Chancellor Tucker reasoned that "ecclesiastical corporations," which
had been created to support the establishment of religion, no longer
existed after disestablishment. 157 In Selden v. Overseers of the Poor,"'
which once more upheld the confiscation of the lands, he again declared
that Virginia's Episcopal Church was not a corporation."•
153. See McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 234. Virginia simply left religious
societies unknown to the law, and its position "left that state out of the mainstream of
American religious development despite its pioneering efforts in establishing the free
exercise of religion." Id.
154. See id. at 233-34.
155. McLaughlin points out that New England's Baptists, unlike those of Virginia,
were sharply divided on the issue of "voluntaryism." See id. at 237-42.
156. 10 Va. (6 Call.) 113 (1804).
I 57. He wrote that "ecclesiastical corporations ... being erected for the purpose of
perpetuating the rights of the established church, must be presumed to have ceased, as
soon as that constitution was established, which did not admit of any establishment of
religion in Virginia." Id. at 133.
158. 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 127 (1840).
159. In deciding the case in the lower court of chancery, Tucker declared:
And here ... it is to be observed, that the Church of England, (and, a fortiori,
the Episcopal [C]hurch in Virginia) is not, and never was a common law
corporation. The Church of England is not degraded to the rank of a
corporation-it is one of the estates of the realm. A bishop, or a parson, is a
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Then he noted the consequence of the incorporeal character of the
Episcopal Church on its hierarchy-it no longer existed. "[W]e may
venture to ask-'How came Virginia by a bishop?' The answer is, 'She
has none.' By courtesy, indeed, certain eminent divines, selected, and so
styled by their brethren, are denominated bishops; but legally speaking
we have none.'' 1w The church could have no more power, that is, than
courtesy would afford it: "Their only power is in the voluntary
submission of the members of their society; their only authority is
derived from the regulation of conventions; (bodies equally unknown to
the law with themselves;) ... .'' 161
Lack of a corporate status also presented a grave obstacle to Catholic
worship, if only because the unincorporated body could not easily hold
property and pass it on. Another case involved an attempt by a man
named Joseph Gallego to create a trust for the construction of a Catholic
Church in Richmond. 162 The trust was held invalid because the identities
of the beneficiaries of the trust were uncertain. 163 As Virginia's Court of
Appeals explained, gifts to an unincorporated beneficiary were gifts to
no one. 164 Tucker noted that "as the society or congregation is not
incorporated, it may well be asked, who are to be regarded as the
beneficiaries entitled to the advantage of this bequest? Who can present
himself as a claimant of this aid designed for the roman catholic
religion? ... Who indeed, constitute the society?" 165
Given that the answers to these questions must always be indefinite,
he concluded that "there cannot be a trust without a cestui que trust; and
if it cannot be ascertained who the cestui que trust is, it is the same thing

corporation, says Mr. Blackstone, but the church is not.
CASES ON CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed.,
1952) (quoting BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 472 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, Birch &
Snell 1803)).
160. Id. at 17.
161. Id. at 18.
162. See Gallego v. Attorney Gen., 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 450 (1832), overruled by
Protestant Episcopal Educ. Soc'y v. Churchman, 80 Va. 718 (1885).
163. See id. at 462.
164. See id. at 450.
165. Id. at 466. Judge Carr agreed:
The bare statement seems sufficient to shew, that under the general rule ...
these would be void. Who are the beneficiaries? [T]he roman catholic
congregation residing in Richmond. And who are they? Suppose you name
them to-day: are those the same persons who constituted the congregation
yesterday? [O)r who will constitute it to-morrow? Will none remove from, or
come to Richmond, to reside? Will none be converted to or from the roman
catholic religion?
Id. at 461 -62.
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as if there was none."",. Virginia's refusal to allow incorporation had
obviously created difficulties for any churches that might have wanted to
come to court to have their disputes settled. The people of Virginia had
put a firm wall of separation between church and state. 167

B.

New York and Massachusetts Say "Yes"

Remaining unknown to the law was one way to handle religious
freedom and disestablishment, but it would not suit denominations in
other states. One reason, already obvious, is that many clergy could not
long have remained content with the kind of thinking that held that
Virginia had no Bishop except by courtesy. Additionally, churches held
property-property that would come under attack from outside the
church and come into dispute within. The question of who owned the
property could be answered much more certainly when the church was
incorporated.
In 1784, New York passed an act allowing general incorporation. 168
The statute, besides allowing men to incorporate freely for religious
purposes, also provided for the assignment of church property to lay
trustees."' This provision was repeated in a statute of 1813. 170 The
reason that the property was commended to the care of lay trustees was
to ensure that the hierarchy of the churches could not wrest ultimate
control of the church away from the parishioners."' This assignment of
property was the direct expression of the close connection that early
Americans saw between civil and religious liberty. It was a literal
translation of Locke's insistence that the powers of government are held
166. Id. at 466. Likewise, Judge Carr added: "For it is to the roman catholic
congregation for the time being, that the legacies are given." Id. at 462.
167. This Article does not endorse the idea that Jefferson's "wall of separation"
metaphor is the only metaphor by which to interpret the First Amendment. That is a
controversial subject, and although the incorporation debate is relevant, thorough
treatment would require an entire piece. For the argument that the United States
Supreme Court adopted Jefferson's view too blithely, see GARVEY, supra note 15, at
139-54; MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CoNSflTIJTIONAL HlsrORY 6-7 (1965).
168. See HOWE, supra note 167, at 45; McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 234-35.
169. See PAfRICK J. DIGNAN, A HlsrORY OF THE LEGAL lNCORPORAflON OF
CATHOLIC CHURCH PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1784-1932), at 52-53 (1935);
McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 234.
170. See DIGNAN, supra note 169, at 64.
171. As Archbishop Marechal reported in 1818, the property arrangements
established by law led American Catholics "to believe that they also have the right to
elect and dismiss their pastors as they please." Id. at 108-09.
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only in trust. Like their counterparts in secular governments, clergy
would have to secure the consent of their people if they were to continue
as governors in their churches. Their inability to control the property of
the churches would prevent them from abusing their positions of trust.
Massachusetts also settled on incorporation as a solution to the
problems posed by religious liberty, although Massachusetts, with its
domestic congregational establishment, did not proceed through exactly
the same steps as New York. Congregational churches were established
in each town; that is, the boundaries of the parish and the town were
coextensive and tax monies-called a "general assessment"-were paid
to the town's parish. 112 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780
provided that the assessment could be paid to whichever religion
commanded a majority in the town, as well as to any churches deciding
to incorporate."' Thus Massachusetts used tax monies to support
religion, but in the wake of the Revolution it made the revenues
available to a broader range of denominations.
Incorporation thus represented the first attempt by Massachusetts to
accommodate the demands of religious tolerance. The next issue was
how to address the circumstances of non-incorporating denominations
such as the Baptists. In 1810 the Supreme Judicial Court made clear that
unincorporated denominations could not avail themselves of the
assessments. 174 "If the construction which was contended for was right,
then a Roman Catholic teacher might maintain an action similar to the
175
plaintiff's." In Barnes v. First Parish, 116 the court explained that "the
constitution has not provided in any way for the legal support of any
teacher of piety, religion, and morality, unless he be a public Protestant
teacher of some incorporated religious society." 177 Later on, in line with
the intention of an act of 1811, the court decided that unincorporated
religious societies could also avail themselves of the tax exemption. 178 In
1824 the Religious Liberty Act ended the general assessment and
replaced it with a completely voluntary system of general
172. See McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 226-30, 236-37.
173. See id. at236-37.
174. See Barnes v. First Parish. 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 401 (1810). "For, although the
constitution contemplates different denominations of Protestant Christians. yet no
religious societies are referred to, unless incorporated; and no teachers are mentioned as
existing, who are not entitled to a maintenance." Id. at 413.
175. Id.at4!3-14.
176. 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 401 (1810).
177. Id. at 412.
178. See Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. ( 13 Tyng) 340 ( 1817). The statute of 1811 now
"puts corporate and unincorporated societies upon the same footing, and makes no
distinction between such as have an ordained minister specially settled over them, and
such as are occasionally taught by preachers who may be ordained at large, or as
ministers of other parishes." Id. at 344.
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179
mcorporat10n.
In the years following the American Revolution, the general
incorporation of religious denominations found approval as a means of
answering the difficult questions related to establishment and free
exercise. Virginia was an exception. Its disapproval of formal
incorporation, however, did not signal that the state disapproved of
associations as such, or of religious associations in particular. Virginia's
denial of corporate status reflected a belief that voluntary associations, in
order to be truly voluntary, could not be state-supported. It did not
represent the hostility toward associations and corporations that was felt
by Rousseau and his intellectual heirs.
The early years of religious incorporation, if the field is surveyed
broadly, gave a ringing affirmation of the role that corporations and
associations could play in resolving thorny public issues.
The
experience of the churches demonstrates that disestablishment in the
United States, which was going to be a federated process simply by
virtue of dual federalism, was hyper-federated. It also serves as a
caution against facile assertions that American society and the law were
supremely individualist in the years after the Revolution.

V. THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF THE CORPORATION AND THE
ACCOMMODATION TO GROUP PERSONALITY

To state the achievement of the corporate solution in another way, it
allowed important public purposes to be addressed by society, or
societies, thus avoiding the joint dangers of individualism and being coopted by government. In this sense incorporation provided a solution to
one of the most vexing problems that had been posed by antifederalists:
The United States was too big to have a government "of the people."
Anitfederalist Richard Henry Lee, writing as "The Federal Farmer,"
insisted in 1787 that fair representation required "that every order of
men in the community ... can have a share in it." 180 The republic, he
contended, was too big too allow such extensive representation. 181
Madison's famous response was The Federalist No. 10, in which he
argued that the vast extent of the nation would actually represent a
179. See McLoughlin, supra note 137, at 242.
180. [Richard Henry Lee], Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican,
Letter II (October 9, 1787), reprinted in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS
269, 269 (Leonard Kriegel ed., 1964).
18 I. See id. at 269-70.
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greater number of interests: "Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater
variety of parties and interests .... " 182 His solution was to increase the
number of groups so as to encourage a multiplicity of interests, which is
just what the newly-incorporated churches were preparing to do as the
nineteenth century progressed.
It is not too much to say that incorporation led to the invention of a
new type of legal personality. States could play some role in the
maintenance of religious belief while avoiding, or appearing to avoid,
any interference with religious freedom. For the most part, the various
denominations, though insistent that they depended on the voluntary
adherence of their followers, also wanted this state recognition. That is
to say that they wanted their moral personalities translated into legal
personality.
As the experience of the churches suggests, this recognition required
compromise, so that the corporate enterprise should not deviate far from
American ways. In some respects, the most interesting feature of the
incorporation of churches is the way in which the legal systems of the
states made way for what we might call a "moral constitution,"
expressed in a set of beliefs about what distinguished a good corporation
from a bad one. Should a corporation, for example, be ruled by one
person, by a few, or by many? As time passed, the rules governing the
"moral constitution" evolved, and the new moral personalities pushed
themselves on the states in a way that the individual could not.
From this vantage point, the religious corporations provide a concrete
illustration of Tocqueville's observations on the importance of
association in American society. The principle of association had
replaced the niche once occupied by privileged orders in Europe. In
America, the corporation was expected to offer the moral sustenance to
the nation that had been the business of the aristocracy in Europe.
A.

Majority Rule

One of the first questions faced by the church societies was also faced
by the governments at the same time: Who should govern? From the
first, an important feature of a properly-constituted corporation in the
early republic was that it should not be ruled by one person, whether
king or minister. Madison stated this presumptive rule by questioning
the wisdom of the ancients when they allowed individuals to govern. In
one passage of The Federalist he observed:
It is not a little remarkable that in every case reported by ancient history, in

182.
1964).
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which government has been established with deliberation and consent, the task
of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men, but has been
performed by some individual citizen of preeminent wisdom and approved
integrity. 183

Concluding that it was undesirable for a people to "so far abandon the
rules of caution as to place their destiny in the hands of a single
184
citizen," Madison argued that his contemporaries should "admire the
improvement made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and
establishing regular plans of government."'"
A similar rule prohibiting any individual from holding extensive
powers of government was applied to the governance of religious
186
societies as well.
Thus, as noted above, the property of incorporated
churches typically had to be held by a number of trustees. 187 As a
modem scholar can see, this was not a rule of nature, but it was very
similar to the rule of government that Locke had devised by ruminating
about life in a state of nature. 188 Because the people were the ones who
I 83. THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 233 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed.,
1964).
184. Id. at 234.
185. Id. at 235. This point was preliminary to the central purpose of The Federalist
No. 38, which was to argue that, just as Americans ought to learn from the mistakes of
the ancients, so they should avail themselves of the lessons that their experience under
the Articles of Confederation would teach them about their own mistakes. See id. at
233-42.
186. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
I 87. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
188. This characterization is supplied by Philip Hamburger, who distinguishes
between natural law as "traditional right reason" and natural law as "a mode of reasoning
about the liberty of individuals in the state of nature." Philip A. Hamburger, Revolution
and Judicial Review: Chief Justice Holt's Opinion in City of London v. Wood, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 2091, 2121 (1994).
This description of Locke's natural law reasoning is important because it distinguishes
between natural law considered in terms of substantive rules of justice, and natural law
considered in procedural terms. Hamburger points to a procedural role as one of the
most important that Locke furnished: That in civil society no one could be judge in his
own cause. See id. at 2121, 2134-36. From this procedural entitlement, according to
Hamburger, Locke derived a rudimentary theory of judicial review: "On this basis,
numerous writers, most notably Locke, reasoned further that if a dispute arose between a
people and their government, the latter could not decide between them, for it could not
be judge in its own case." Id. at 2122.
The distinction is crucial in modem law in areas such as voting rights, in which
fundamental disagreements often stem from differences, as Larry Alexander has put it,
between those who advocate "a substantive conception of democracy" and those who
champion "a procedural conception of democracy." Larry Alexander, Still Lost in the
Political Thicket (or Why I Don't Understand the Concept of Vote Dilution), 50 VAND.
L. REV. 327, 329 (1997). One of the lessons of the early church experience is that the
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actually created the nation's wealth, they were entitled to withhold it
from a leader who was violating his public trust. It would be
incongruous to permit one person to be able to run the congregation's
affairs without accountability. The legislatures were saying, in effect,
that monarchy was no more legitimate in church government than in
secular government, and they were generally happy to impose this belief
as a rule of law.
Originally, the prescribed form of government was aristocratic rather
than democratic. Control of the property of a given parish was vested in
trustees and not in the whole body of the congregation. Over time,
however, there was relentless pressure to extend control in democratic
fashion. This happened in Massachusetts through judicial construction
of the Constitution of 1780 in Baker v. Fales,"' decided in 1820. The
Supreme Judicial Court refused to restore "to the churches the power
they once enjoyed, of electing the minister without concurrence of the
190
people or congregation. " It was "not at all consistent with the spirit of
the times, that the great majority should ... be subject to the minority."'"
The court, although sensible that religion presented a special legal
problem, operated on a premise of majority rule drawn from political
philosophy and consonant with "the spirit of the times," but one that was
nowhere explicitly written in law.
Likewise, whereas the trustee system of New York began on a quasiaristocratic basis, by the middle of the century the New York Court of
Appeals construed incorporation statutes of 1784 and 1813 to increase
the power of the conr,egation at the expense of the trustees. In
Robertson v. Bullions,' 2 the court decided that the members of the
congregation were in fact incorporated and the trustees were merely "the
managing officers of the corporation."'" "These officers," declared the
court, "are trustees, in the same sense with the president and directors of
194
a bank, or of a railroad company." Religious societies were "not to be
regarded as ecclesiastical corporations, in the sense of the English law,
which were composed entirely of ecclesiastical persons . . . but as
belonging to the class of civil corporations to be controlled and managed
according to the principles of the common law."'" According to the
two conceptions of justice are often intertwined.
Procedural allocations may
discriminate against denominations with doctrinal commitments that are inconsistent
with the initial allocations.
189. 16 Mass. (15 Tyng) 488 (1820).
190. Id. at 521.
191. Id.
192. 11 N.Y. 243 (1854).
193. Id. at 250.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 251-52.
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court, it was the "intention of the legislature, to place the control of the
temporal affairs of these societies in the hands of the majority of the
incorporators, independent of ~riest or bishop, presbytery, synod, or
other ecclesiastical judicatory." 1 By statute, "the salary of the minister
is put absolutely, and at all times, under the control of a majority of the
congregation," not the trustees alone. 197 Appointments were also
determined by the laity:
It would be in vain, for any donor of property or funds to the congregation, to
prescribe the religious faith of the minister to whose support the avails should
be devoted; for, until the salary should be fixed by a majority of the
congregation, not one dollar of the revenues of the society could be
appropriated by the trustees to its payment. 198

Just as American governments had introduced safeguards to ensure
that they would never be subject to the tyrannical rule of an individual,
so American churches were being required to subject themselves to
democratic precepts. Law was being fashioned to accommodate a
democratic moral personality.
B.

Incorporation and Catholicism

The issue of majority rule relates closely to a second important moral
attribute of incorporation: anti-Catholicism. In McGinnis v. Watson,' 99
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the course of deciding that the
majority of a congregation could annex the church with the Associate
Reformed Synod, declared that the State could not punish "regular and
200
orderly changes in religion ... without condemning the Reformation."
What about a church whose express purpose was to condemn the
Reformation? The Catholic experience of incorporation points to one of
the peculiarities of American law in the first half of the nineteenth
century: in many states Catholic Churches were allowed to incorporate,
but only according to Protestant rules.
The law was tolerant and intolerant at the same time. Catholic
196. Id. at 263-64. The holding left church doctrine at the mercy of the majority: If
"a trust was intended in favor of persons of a particular religious faith; then, I hold it to
be clear, that a religious corporation in this state, can be the recipient of no such trust."
Id. at 262-63.
191. Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
198. Id.
199. 41 Pa. 9 (1861).
200. Id. at 19.
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congregations were allowed to worship freely in the new nation, but
their freedom was qualified. In Massachusetts Catholic churches could
201
worship but not incorporate.
In other states, notably New York,
Catholic churches could incorporate but were subject to the trustee
202
requirement.
This requirement, which vested control of the church's
government in a group of laymen rather than in a member of the church
hierarchy, was obviously antithetical to the governmental structure of the
Catholic Church.
This discrimination was intentional, and it led to a longstanding
conflict.
Courts in Virginia, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Massachusetts all expressed, at one time or another, hostility toward
20
Catholicism. ' The result of this hostility was a lengthy battle between
204
the church hierarchy and the state legislatures.
On many occasions,
there were also battles between trustees and their bishops. 205 The
eventual result was an accommodation, as states began to recognize that
the Catholic form of government required a different disposition of
church properties.
In 1863, New York passed a statutory amendment allowing Catholics
to "incorporate accordingly as may be most suitable to their
206
discipline."
The amendment provided for a high degree of
ecclesiastical control over the lay trustees and was considered a victory
by the church. Other states followed New York's lead, and in the next
few years Connecticut and New Jersey passed similar statutes. 207
The problem was not resolved completely, however, until 1913, when
the Pennsylvania Legislature likewise relented to the demands of the
church hierarchy.'°' With this statutory amendment, the long struggle
over incorporation came to an end. It was a struggle that demonstrated
both the capacity of the American system to tolerate diversity, and its
rigidity as well.

20 I. As Dignan notes, Catholics enjoyed nominal freedom in Massachusetts even
while the Congregational churches continued to enjoy a privileged status. See DIGNAN,
supra note 169, at 20-22.
202. See id. at 64-66, 73-76.
203. See id. at 64-84; see also supra notes 162-66, 175 and accompanying text;
infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
204. See id. at 67-140 (detailing the trustee controversy).
205. See id.
206. Id. at 207.
207. See id. at 210.
208. See id. at 234.
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C.

The Protestant Constitution and the Rule of
Distinct and Independent Societies

The dispute over Catholicism also illustrates the manner in which the
new nation, despite its ability to accommodate diversity, was committed
to traditional beliefs and practices. Given that the United States was
founded on the will of the people, it was inevitable that their will would
begin to find its way even into the laws that governed religion. It was
inevitable that the character of American government and society would
impress itself on the church corporations. This struggle, therefore, offers
a good look at the group nature of the new extended polity of the United
States.
To many Americans at the time of the Revolution, it was obvious that
freedom was a Protestant commodity. The Reverend Samuel West,
mentioned above for his contention that "the collective body of the
state" alone was entitled to determine whether a government was
tyrannical, also contended that civil government itself was sanctioned by
the Bible.",. After the Revolution, even those dedicated to religious
liberty were prone to identify Protestant rules as essential rules of good
government.
This was made plain in debates over the 1855 passage in New York of
an incorporation law aimed specifically at the Catholic hierarchy." 0 The
bill, which meant to ensure that bishops could not evade the trustee
system of ownership, was supported by Senator Brooks, who professed
it his "aim to show that the political State is Protestant in its character, if
not in its constitution-that its Republican success has been mainly
founded upon its Protestant religion, that other systems of faith are not in
harmony with true civil and religious liberty."211 Though speaking many
years after the Revolution, Brooks sounded just like preachers from
1776. Freedom itself had a particular religious content and was thus
inseparable from right religion.
Quite apart from their disagreement with the Senator, Catholics made
an extremely important observation about this species of freedom. It
was premised on a view of popular sovereignty that centered not on the
individual but on the group. In one New York parish, lay trustees
209. "This account of the nature and design of civil government, which is so clearly
suggested to us by the plain principles of common sense and reason, is abundantly
confirmed by the sacred Scriptures ...." WEST, supra note 98, at 423.
210. See DIGNAN, supra note 169, at 194.
211. Id. (citation omitted).
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attempted to force the selection of a new priest, claiming the right to
choose and discharge priests.m According to Father John Carroll, who
mediated the dispute, the trustees asserted an American right of selfgovernment with respect to church affairs:
I solemnly aver that those who excite these troubles maintained in my
presence by their lawyers in a public tribunal, and upheld with all their
might ... that all right to exercise ecclesiastical ministry was derived from the
people . . . . Then they deny that they are or ever have been subject to my
episcopal authority; and when the words of the Pope's brief were shown them,
in which all the faithful in the United States are subject to the Bishop, they
impudently dared to assail the brief as imposing a yoke on them contrary to
American laws. 213

This kind of thought, he asserted, threatened "the unity and catholicity of
our Church," which would degenerate into "distinct and independent
societies, nearly in the same manner as the congregation Presbyterians of
our neighboring New England States."'"
In pointing to the danger of separating into "distinct and independent
societies," Carroll put his finger on one of the distinguishing features not
just of New England religious life, but of American life in general: It
was characterized not by excessive attention to the individual, but by a
solicitude for the small group. Whether he realized it or not, he was
taking an active part in the process of incorporation that was making
federalism and separation of powers into a rule of American law. In
attempting to make a place for the moral personality of his church in
New York law, he was helping to create a nation that was itself
composed of small nations.

D. Alexis de Tocqueville and the Sanctity of Association
Aviam Soifer wryly notes that "[i]t is de rigeur to begin any serious
discussion of the role of groups in America with Alexis de Tocqueville's
observation[s]" about the part that associations played in American
society."' This Article has put him, perversely, near the end. Yet the
meaning of Tocqueville's analysis is often overlooked, as Soifer notes,
in favor of disputes over vague notions of "communal versus
216
individualistic values." It may be that placing him after the discussion
of church corporations will help focus his remarks.
The story of the churches certainly illustrates Tocqueville' s thesis.
The churches provide a concrete example of the role that voluntary
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

142

See id. at 74-75, 81-84.
Id. at 83 (citation omitted).
Id. at 75 (citation omitted).
SOIFER, supra note 7, at 32.
Id.
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associations played in the early national years of American society, as
they show the way in which the corporate form began to move nearer to
the heart of American law. If we attribute to these early Americans an
obsessive, possessive individualism such as that which besets us today,
we have missed the significance of the incorporation of the churches.
Tocqueville did not, and for confirmation of the sanctity of
associations in general in the early republic, we need only look through
his eyes. Long before the end of the debate over Catholic control of
church property, he observed that American government had handed
over much of its business to associations, which served almost as
competitors in the provision of the public good. 217 Regretful of the
attack mounted against tradition by the general will in his native France,
he remarked on the essential public service done in America by
voluntary associations."' The species of liberty that would be decried in
the next century by Americans themselves as mere bourgeois
individualism was seen by Tocqueville as the antithesis of individualism
and the sine qua non of democratic freedom. 21 '
As Tocqueville saw the issue, in the French Revolution despotism was
the result of the assertion that the only true civic relation was that of the
individual and the State, coupled with an insistence on equality."" The
Revolution had destroyed all corporate pretenders to sovereignty,
eliminating "those individual powers which were able singlehanded to
cope with tyranny." 221 The nation had, in effect, confiscated their
powers, for "the government alone ... has inherited all the prerogatives
snatched from families, corporations, and individuals.""'
By contrast, wrote Tocqueville, Americans had "used liberty to
combat the individualism born of equality, and they have won.""' Their
liberty, which began with the freedom of the individual, found its purest
217. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513 (J.P. Mayer ed. &
George Lawrence trans., I 969) ("In every case, at the head of any new undertaking,
where in France you would find the government or in England some territorial magnate,
in the United States you are sure to find an association.").
218. See id. at 697 ("An association, be it political, industrial, commercial, or even
literary or scientific, is an educated and powerful body of citizens which cannot be
twisted to any man's will or quietly trodden down, and by defending its private interests
against the encroachments of power, it saves the common liberties.").
219. See id. at 511.
220. See infra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
221. Id. at 15.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 511.
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expression not in the immediate relationship between the individual and
the State, but in the practice of voluntary association.
The spirit of association led to civic triumphs in several areas, and
Tocqueville saw quite clearly that corporate activity was not restricted to
one area of endeavor. He believed that one victory of the Revolution
was recorded in the field of religion, in which America had combined
the "two perfectly distinct elements which elsewhere have often been at
war with one another."224 These elements were "the spirit of religion and
the spirit of freedom."'" Tocqueville believed that such a combination
was not possible under a government that believed that corporations
existed only at the sufferance of the sovereign.
In America, the liberty to be let alone was combined, via freedom of
association, with a liberty to achieve a higher good. 226 According to
Tocqueville, though American freedom was based on the individual, it
found social expression even outside of government. 227 The political
228
freedoms reminded the American "that he lives in society." Moreover,
Americans learned their civic duties through a wide variety of
associations. Political associations were "only one small part of the
immense number of different types of associations found there."'"
Americans of every age were "forever forming associations" of every
kind: "religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited,
immensely large and very minute."230
The legitimacy of these associations did not depend on the prior
approval of the government."' Combination managed what was
accomplished by governmentally-accorded privilege in other nations,
and the associations allowed the de facto inequality that was no longer
tolerable at law: "associations must take the place of the powerful
private persons whom equality of conditions has eliminated.""' The
224. Id. at 46.
225. Id. at 47.
226. For a good expos1Uon of the differences between the two liberties, see
generally ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958), reprinted in FOUR ESSAYS
ON LIBERTY 118 (1969). This Article does not follow Berlin in calling them "negative••
and "positive," mainly because there are always people willing to misunderstand the
point that he tried to make. Subsequent commentators have found it very easy to assume
that positive liberty is an unqualified good, and that negative liberty is, in the main, a bad
thing. This was far from the point that he sought to establish. For his attempt to deal
with critical commentary on the distinction, see id. at ix.
227. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 217, at 512.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 513.
230. Id.
231. "In every case, at the head of any new undertaking, where in France you would
find the government or in England some territorial magnate, in the United States you are
sure to find an association." Id.
232. Id. at 516.
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American government was now dependent on the social formations that
in theory preceded it. The theory that underlay federalism and the
separation of powers had been extended to bodies that could not
properly be said to be within the government.
VI. THE CORPORATION AND MORAL PERSONALITY IN THE PRESENT

This section explores the importance of the corporate form in modem
law by returning to those who criticize American law for its
individualism. There is little point in tracing the influence of the
business corporation into the present day. No one doubts the enormous
powers of these leviathans; to demonstrate that they receive
extraordinary protection under American law would not speak to the
criticisms leveled by the advocates of group protection.
It is more to the point to understand that the powers of corporate
entities are too often misdescribed in terms of individualism, and are too
often justified simply by reference to their property rights. The Article
thus addresses the modem issue in two ways: First, it shows how the
gains made by corporations in the nineteenth century have provided for
some extremely important but unappreciated instances of group
protection in the twentieth century. The contention here is that
American law actually has extraordinary tolerance for group rights and
diversity, particularly when the group is a corporation that has dedicated
property to sustaining a way of life that is considered compatible with
widely shared American values. Second, the Article returns to the
criticism of individualism leveled at American law, in order to make a
more accurate and pointed assessment of the subject of group protection
and its failures.
Here the Article argues that the supposedly
individualistic tendencies of the American legal system are better
viewed as the flip side of the predisposition toward groups that are
voluntarily assembled with property to devote a cause. In short, when
the law appears to demonstrate an aversion to group rights, it is often
resisting an attempt to assign people to a group without their clear
consent and refusing to vindicate a claim that is not supported by
property.
A.

Group Personality and the State: A Two-Way Street

The government has made a special place for the corporate and moral
personality of the group, a place that has been earned as the result of
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compromise between the State and the group. The reason that the
significance of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century moral vision of the
corporation is not purely historical is that it shows how some of these
compromises were struck. During this time American government and
American corporations came to an accommodation and, as a result, a
new kind of moral personality appeared on the legal landscape. As the
century progressed even the business corporation came to be treated
more often as a person at law. The most important instance of this
tendency came in Santa Clara County v. Southern Paci.fie Railroad,"' in
which the United States Supreme Court announced that the corporation
was a person within the contemplation of the Fourteenth Amendment.234
The corporate personality enjoyed an extraordinary range of
privileges, but it was also often limited by compromises with the State.
233. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
234. Morton Horwitz has contended at length that the Santa Clara decision did not
recognize the corporation as a natural entity. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 65107 (1992). Instead, he argues it accepted the argument that corporate interests should
be understood as the interests of the shareholders considered individually. He points to
jurists such as Justice Field, who had written in the California case of County of San
Mateo v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), that "whenever a
provision of the constitution, or of a law, guarant[e]es to persons the enjoyment of
property ... the benefits of the provision extend to corporations, and that the courts will
always look beyond the name of the artificial being to the individuals whom it
represents." Id. at 744.
Moreover, Horwitz asserts that the natural entity theory of the corporation "was not
available at the time the case was decided," HORWITZ, supra, at 70, and was not to
emerge until the end of the nineteenth century. See id. at 70-74.
The most obvious flaw in this argument is that the Court in Santa Clara did actually
rule that the corporation was a person, without offering any theoretical justification, and
it did not explicitly maintain that the corporation merely represented the interests of the
individuals who made it up. Beyond this, Horwitz' s argument is not exhaustive, for it
consults only the opinions of a few jurists-who might just a few years back have been
denounced by authors such as Horwitz as "formalists"-and the writings of some
contemporary legal theorists. He takes no account of what was forcing the law to accord
a brand new status to the corporation, i.e., what social phenomena were forcing the law
into retreating from the concession theory of corporate creation. It is interesting to learn
that the theory of the time was confined to individual property rights, but we should not
be surprised that theory did not fully describe what the courts were actually doing.
It is hardly surprising that judicial language did not fully express the nature of the
claims that judicial opinions were vindicating; indeed, one of the most important of this
Article's contentions is that, even in the present day, the courts have not found language
that adequately explains the advantages that corporate entities enjoy under the law. In
addition, with regard to the individual nature of the claims being sustained, Horwitz
shows only that individual corporators were allowed to assert their rights as individuals
in claiming on behalf of the corporation. He does not show that those rights were
identical, or that they were assumed by the courts to be identical.
As Garvey notes, we continue to describe corporate and other group rights as the rights
of the individuals who compose the group, but our descriptions do not always accurately
describe the nature of the rights we protect, or accurately identify the "person" bearing
the rights. See GARVEY, supra note 15, at 123-28.
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Perhaps most importantly, corporate law had to embody some of the
precepts of American political theory, such as rules regarding
democratic control. As Dartmouth College v. Woodward'-" showed, this
meant that corporations, like governments themselves, originated in
contracts. 236 The effect of the decision was thus to protect the
corporation against state intrusions, in accord with the argument that the
colonies had used against England in the years after 1764-that a
colonial charter was a contract between a King and his people. 237 Of
course, in this case it was the State that was bound by the democratic
rule of governance; the trustees of the College were undoubtedly very
happy with the result. It is hard to imagine that they felt they had been
forced to compromise very much.
The area of church law shows that the extension of protection to
religious corporations was often accompanied by compromise with the
government. Churches were forced to make some concessions to the
character of the states and nation in which they made their claims of
religious liberty; they had to prove, in effect, that they were sociable. As
the dispute over the proper way to incorporate churches highlights,
churches often had to accept rules of property ownership, and thus forms
235. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
236. It is easy to miss the real significance of Danmouth College by fixing too
quickly on the fact that the Court vindicated a property right, as Gerald Frug does:
In determining where to draw the public/private distinction for
corporations, the courts first decided what was important to protect against
state power. In Trustees of Danmouth College v. Woodward ... the United
States Supreme Court gave its response to this question, an answer that came
straight from Locke: what needed protection was property.
Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1102 (1980)
(citation omitted).
It is more instructive to note the kind of property right that the Court recognized, and
the civic relations supposed and supported by this understanding. The integrity of the
corporation was secured by the ruling, with the result that the functions performed by the
trustees were their property. That is to say, these functions were appropriate to them,
and were more properly exercised by them-under the terms of the charter-than by the
State. The case is thus better seen in light of the relation between property and propriety
that has recently been expounded by Greg Alexander and Carol Rose. See GREGORY S.
ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 194-203 (1998); CAROL M. ROSE, "Takings"

and the Practices of Property: Property as Wealth, Property as "Propriety, " in
PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 49, 64 (1994).
237. As the Handlins point out, in cases such as Dartmouth College the Court was
adopting arguments similar to those advanced by American revolutionaries. They cite
the Berkshire County convention in 1774: "Any franchises and liberties ... granted to a
corporation and body politic ... cannot legally be taken from such corporations and
bodies politic, but by their own consent or by forfeiture." HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra
note 129, at 154.
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of government, that did not comport well with their organization or
doctrine. The sociability requirement was expressed in its most extreme
form in Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Later-Day
Saints v. United States,"' which upheld congressional dissolution of the
Mormon Church corporation. One of the reasons that the dissolution
was upheld was that polygamy was considered by many to be
uncivilized."' Justice Bradley had no difficulty in affirming that
Congress's action was constitutional, given that the "organization of a
community for the sr.read and practice of polygamy is, in a measure, a
return to barbarism." 40 Moreover, in the view of the Court the Mormons
had distinguished themselves primarily by their lawlessness; Bradley
referred to "the past history of the sect; to their defiance of the
government authorities; to their attempt to establish an independent
community; to their efforts to drive from the territory all who were not
connected with them in communion and sympathy."241
The message, by the end of the nineteenth century, was clear:
compromise was essential to corporate protection. In fact, the influence
of the compromises into which the churches and the states entered is felt
242
even now by some of the churches.
Notably, in certain respects the
Catholic Church still feels the effects of the Protestant constitution. To
begin with, the Roman Catholic Church as such is not known to
American law, except in the insular possessions gained during the
Spanish-American War. 243 Thus, as one American court put it, the idea
that the church can own property is an "inconceivable assumption." 244 It
is a sovereign power that can acquire property only "by treaty with the
government at Washington."245 This means that in the event that
someone makes off with some church property in the United States, the
Pope cannot come to court to collect it.
On the other hand, neither can lay trustees or the body of any
238. 136 U.S. I (1890).
239. See id. at 49.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Garvey suggests that the decision in Presbyterian Church in the United States
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), the
effect of which "was to free congregational majorities to believe as they like," and thus
to weaken the hierarchy's control over the church, could have a farther-reaching effect.
GARVEY, supra note 15, at 146.
243. See CARL ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW 47 (1917); see also
Santos v. Holy Roman Catholic & Apostolic Church, 212 U.S. 463, 465 (1909)
(recognizing "the legal personality of the Roman Church"); Municipality of Ponce v.
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, 210 U.S. 296, 322 (1908) (discussing property
interests of Spain and the Catholic Church).
244. ZOLLMANN, supra note 243, at 48 (quoting Bonacum v. Murphy, 104 N.W.
180, 182 (Neb. 1905)).
245. Id. (quoting Bonacum, 104 N.W. at 182).
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particular congregation, for the compromise is that archbishops typically
own church property."' Happily for the hierarchy, the property of the
church is thus neither in lay hands nor under the control of a majority of
each parish."' Of course, in a property contest between the Pope and his
American bishops, it appears that American law would have to side with
the bishops.
The result of this compromise is privilege of a kind that is not often
recognized. This fact calls to mind Tocqueville's observation that
American associations were assuming the privileged position that the
aristocracy had once held in France."' Corporations fare well in
American law not merely because of their power, but also because of the
presumptive legitimacy of their associative activities.
It seems evident that such sentiments were capitalized on by the
monstrous combinations bearing the misleading name of "trusts"-close
relatives of the corporation. There is the example of H.H. Rogers, a
prominent figure in the Standard Oil Trust, who gave testimony in the
New York Legislature in 1879. When asked to explain the relation of
the Trust to the oil refiners, Rogers spoke of a rather mystical quality
called "harmony" and of a natural association between husband and
wife. 249 Ninety to ninety-five percent of them, he said, were in
"harmony" with the Trust.

246. That is why, for example, in the famous test case of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), Archbishop
Flores had standing to sue.
24 7. Mere parishioners are excluded from church governance in other
denominations, as well. In the church takings case of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City
of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), for example, parishioners made a motion to
intervene, and the motion was denied. The Second Circuit ruled that the denial was
proper
because the proposed intervenors lack[ed] any legally protectable interest in
this matter. Under New York law, as a Protestant Episcopal Church, St.
Bartholomew's is a corporate body placed in the trusteeship of its church
warden and vestrymen. To the extent that the proposed intervenors are
members of the parish, they enjoy only the right to vote in the election of the
church wardens and vestrymen. Thus, the Rector, Wardens and Members of
the Vestry is the proper party to litigate the constitutionality of encumbrances
placed on Church property.
Id. at 360 (citations omitted).
248. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 217, at 516 ("Among democratic peoples
associations must take the place of the powerful private persons whom equality of
conditions has eliminated.").
249. See DANIEL J. BOORS TIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 41718 (1973).
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Q. When you speak of their being in harmony with the Standard, what do you
mean by that? ...
A. If I am in harmony with my wife, I presume I am at peace with her, and am
working with her.
Q. You are married to her, and you have a contract with her?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that what you mean?
A. Well, some people live in harmony without being married.
Q. Without having a contract?
A. Yes; I have heard so. 250

After being pressed further on the details of the union, Rogers asked
"Well, is it a railroad abuse, or is it an abuse to be in harmony with
people?""' This was a very embarrassing question to ask of a
government that was itself, in theory, based on voluntary association. It
was also a question designed to play on the notion that harmonious
relations leading to property acquisition do not depend on government
252
approval for their legitimacy.
At the time of Rogers's testimony, of course, the trusts were seeking
to avoid legal recognition rather than receive it. Nonetheless, they help
make the point that because associating was assumed to be the thing that
people should be doing even in the absence of government, associations
should at the least not be hindered by government.

B.

The Corporation: Don't Come to Court Without It

Why is this long tradition of group protection in the United States not
more widely recognized? There are two reasons. First, it may be that
even if the law often vindicates the rights of the group, it does so only if
it can articulate those rights in terms of individual property rights. This
seems to be what Glendon has in mind when she maintains that the
residents of Poletown were unable to express how their shared interests
differed from their individual property rights,"' and what Horwitz means
in denying that late nineteenth-century cases relied on an entity theory of
254
corporate rights. In other words, where we might expect to see a group
right, instead we see only the same old property right. Gerald Frug
explained the outcome of Dartmouth College in this way:
250. Id. at 418.
251. Id. (emphasis added).
252. In this regard, note the assertion made in the Massachusetts Constitution that
government was nothing more than "a voluntary association of individuals ... a social
compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with
the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good." li!E
CONSTITUTION OF 1780, supra note 127, at 441.
253. See GLENDON, supra note I, at 110-11.
254. See HORWITZ, supra note 234, at 65- 107.
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In detennining where to draw the public/private distinction for corporations, the
courts first decided what was important to protect against state power. In
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward . .. the United States Supreme
Court gave its response to this question, an answer that came straight from
Locke: what needed protection was property. 255

In Dartmouth College, as in so many cases since, it appears that the
courts are too quick to resolve a group protection right into an individual
property right.
The second reason for this recognition is that we are convinced that
our legal system is individualistic. We have failed to develop a language
adequate to deal with the position that the group actually occupies.
Because we believe that the American tradition is one of individualism,
we have all begun to speak in a language that seeks to make it so. 256
These two tendencies-to speak mistakenly in the language of
individualism and to look askance at the importance of property rightsare not confined to academic commentaries. The Supreme Court has
exaggerated the importance of individual rights in its decisions and from
time to time has shown itself unaware of the power that the propertywielding corporation has enjoyed in American law.
Perhaps the most famous misstatement of the nature of American
rights comes from the case that established the one-man, one-vote rule.
In Reynolds v. Sims"' the Court announced, "Legislators represent
people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or
cities or economic interests.""' To contend that this is true, and to
suggest that it has always been the case, 259 is to ignore that at the time the
255. Frug, supra note 236, at 1102 (citation omitted).
256. This tendency to speak in terms of individual rights, while protecting group
rights, leads to the question of whether-even if the corporation does deserve
extraordinary protection under the law-it deserves to be protected as a "person."
Garvey writes of the confusion that attaches to the use of this word:
I learned in grade school that the plural of "person" was "people." I
learned in law school that it was "persons." Initially I wrote this off as loose
talk-natural enough coming from people who routinely mispronounced Latin
and French nouns. It gradually dawned on me that not all the characters in law
books were people. Some were corporations, unincorporated associations,
trusts, cities, and churches. And the only way of talking collectively about
them was to use that peculiar locution "persons."
GARVEY, supra note 15, at 123.
257. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
258. Id. at 562.
259. See id. at 564 n.41 (quoting James Wilson, delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, for the belief that "elections ought to be equal," and that they were equal
"when a given number of citizens, in one part of the state, choose as many
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nation was founded, the typical solution to the problem of representation
was to compromise between equal representation and representation
weighted to reflect interests. " 0 It is also to forget that one of the
purposes of the bicameral legislature was to represent the interests of
propertied people out of proportion to their numbers. Thus Daniel
Webster, speaking in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of
1820, insisted that property ought to remain the basis of representation
in the Senate."' Webster, who argued and won the Dartmouth College
case, believed that because men of property supported education,
government, and religion, they should be protected in their possession."'
In short, representatives have often represented people who owned
acres and trees, and organizations, rather than individuals as such. It
might be objected that the Reynolds Court was merely calling for an end
to a long tradition of representation of property rights, but that is not
exactly what it did. It pretended a continuity between the present and
the past on the issue; in fact, in addition to trotting out James Wilson, the
Court quoted Yick Wo v. Hopkins 263 for the proposition that "the political
franchise of voting" is "a fundamental political right, because
preservative of all rights."264
Yick Wo, of course, had much more to do with property rights than
voting rights. It is no coincidence that the Anglo-American tradition has
long hallowed property as the preservative of all rights. Yet, even as
Americans vaunt the property right, there seems to be little conviction as
to the reason that property is believed to be fundamental. 265 Seen in this
light, the Court's loose use of history and its tendency to gravitate
toward dicta may well indicate a failure to come to terms with certain
essential features of American law. In fact, even in Reynolds the Court
was unable to explain the nature of the right that it was protecting, for
the Reynolds rule has more to do with group rights than with individual
. hts. 266
ng
representatives, as are chosen by the same number of citizens, in any other part of the
state").
260. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
26 I. See I THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: SPEECHES AND FORMAL WRITINGS,
1800-1833, at 61-81 (Charles M. Wiltse ed., 1986).
262. See id. at 73-76. "I cannot, therefore, sir, agree that it is in favor of society, or
in favor of the people, to constitute government, with an entire disregard to those who
bear the public burdens, in times of great exigency." Id. at 73.
263. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
264. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370).
265. See Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
329, 333 (I 996) ("There are many reasons why one might say that property is an
important right. But why would anyone say that property is the keystone right, the
central right on which all others rest?").
266. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding
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This emphasis on the importance of groups is greater still when the
Court is dealing with groups that have property, although this fact too is
often overlooked. There is a tradition of mistakes-whether accidental
or not-that has led us to recharacterize a group property right as an
individual right of some other, "purer" kind. The most famous recent
expression of this tendency to divorce the substantive claim from the
property interest of the group asserting it came in Employment Division,
261
Department of Human Resources v. Smith.
The Court in this case
denied the Free Exercise claim made by two Native Americans who
were dismissed from their jobs because of their ritual use of peyote, a
use that was in accord with the ceremonies of the Native American
Church. 268 They were subsequently denied unemployment benefits, a
denial which they contested on Free Exercise grounds. 269 Justice Scalia
explained in his majority opinion that such claims were never upheld on
Free Exercise grounds alone, but only when accompanied by another
claim."0 He went on to list a number of cases presenting such hybrid
in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2292 (1998). Issacharoff and Karlan
maintain that voting rights are primarily defined in terms of groups:
The Court's difficulties in talking about race are exacerbated by its
confusion regarding the nature of voting and reapportionment. If "[a]t the
heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple
command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals," then
redistricting stabs at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment every time. Every
reapportionment involves treating voters as members of a few, crudely defined
groups rather than treating them as individuals with unique constellations of
attributes and concerns. Voting does have several profoundly individualistic
dimensions, which arise from the way in which it recognizes the voter as a
full-fledged member of the community capable of participating actively in selfgovernance, but redistricting is not one of them. Reapportionment is almost
entirely about the collective, aggregative aspects of the political process.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,911 (1995) (quoting
Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting))).
"We have argued elsewhere that even Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and its
progeny should be viewed as cases about group political power and majoritarian control
rather than purely about individual rights." Issacharoff & Karlan, supra, at 2282 n.30
(citing Lani Guinier & Pamela S. Karlan, The Majoritarian Difficulty: One Person, One
Vote, in REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE 207, 211-13
(E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights
To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1717-18 (1993)).
267. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
268. See id. at 874.
269. See id.
270. The Court provided:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise
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claims but failed to note that the distinguishing feature in these cases
was generally the presence of a corporation (or other associative entity)
making a property claim.
One of the cases identified by Justice Scalia as a First Amendment
case is Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"' which is well-known for
vindicating a Catholic Free Exercise claim made against an Oregon
statute requiring that children be educated in public schools."' Yet the
case does not deserve its reputation. It was decided not on free exercise
grounds, but on the basis of substantive due process."' The outcome had
much more to do with the fact that the case was brought by a corporation
that claimed invasion of a property right than with the protection of free
exercise guaranteed by the Constitution. That is to say, without the
"Society" and the school that it owned, the "Sisters" would have been in
a much more precarious position. The majority opinion begins by
recognizing that the Society of Sisters is an Oregon corporation that has
dedicated property to the enterprise of Catholic education. 274 Later it
asserts that the corporate appellees "are threatened with destruction
through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants are exercising
over present and prospective patrons of their schools," and declares that
"this [C]ourt has gone very far to protect against loss threatened by such
action." 275
Commentators do not often recognize the role that property actually
played in the disposition of the case. 276 Nor do they frequently observe
Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of
speech and of the press, or the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, to direct the education of their children.
Id. at 881 (citations omitted).
271. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
272. In characterizing Pierce this way, Justice Scalia echoed Justice Douglas in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), who cited Pierce and Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), as cases decided under the First Amendment: "The association of
people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights. The right to
educate a child in a school of the parents' choice-whether public or private or
parochial-is also not mentioned .... Yet the First Amendment has been construed to
include certain of those rights." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
Justice Black objected to this explanation of the two cases, arguing in dissent that "the
reasoning stated in Meyer and Pierce was the same natural law due process philosophy
which many later opinions repudiated, and which I cannot accept." Id. at 516 (Black, J.,
dissenting). He pointed out that in Pierce the Court ruled "that a state law requiring that
all children attend public schools interfered unconstitutionally with the property rights of
private school corporations because it was an 'arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful
interference' which threatened 'destruction of their business and property."' Id. (Black,
J., dissenting) (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 536).
273. John Attanasio suggested this point.
274. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531-32.
275. Id. at 535.
276. For a very good article that examines the property issues in the case, see
generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child? Meyer and Pierce and the
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that there was another appellee in the case, the Hill Military Academy,
which was also an Oregon corporation.277 The Military Academy,
presumably, dedicated its property to a different kind of education but
benefited from the same ruling as the Sisters. Pierce is one of the cases
cited by Justice Scalia as a hybrid because it vindicated a claim that
parents have a right to educate their children as well as a free exercise
claim."' Does Pierce not also suggest that it is better to present a free
exercise claim as a corporation with a property interest at stake?
The legal system has also managed to accommodate the demands of
other moral personalities even though they do not take true corporate
form. In another of the cases cited by Justice Scalia, Wisconsin v.
219
Yoder, two kinds of quasi-corporations came under attack by the State
of Wisconsin: the family and the Amish people, considered as both a
religious and social unit. This case leaves little doubt that the Court was
doing something other than protecting an individual's right to exercise
religion freely, for the majority opinion announced its views on
corporatism, nature, and society. 280
In deciding whether Amish children should be exempt from a
requirement of compulsory attendance at public schools in Wisconsin,
the majority opinion considered it very important that the Amish religion
was an old one that had preserved essential social values. 281 The Amish
were older than America itself. The Amish family deserved further
consideration as a "natural" social unit because, though separate from
American society, it was self-sufficient.'" Far from being anti-social,
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARYL. REv. 995 (1992).
277. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 532-33. The Court stated:
Appellee, Hill Military Academy, is a private corporation organized in
1908 under the laws of Oregon, engaged in owning, operating and conducting
for profit an elementary, college preparatory and military training school for
boys between the ages of five and twenty-one years .... It owns considerable
real and personal property, some useful only for school purposes. The
business and incident good will are very valuable.
Id.
278. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881
(1990).
279. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
280. See Katz, supra note 13, at 20 (recognizing Yoder for the group protection it
affords and contending that the Court has since retreated from the protection of groups).
281. "We must not forget that in the Middle Ages important values of the
civilization of the Western World were preserved by members of religious orders who
isolated themselves from all worldly influences against great obstacles." Yoder, 406
U.S. at 223.
282. The Court declared:
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the Amish ethic was highly compatible with the concerns of other
Americans. 283
Most strikingly, the Amish "communities" created a dependable
individual who would have found favor with the Founders themselves:
When Thomas Jefferson emphasized the need for education as a bulwark of a
free people against tyranny, there is nothing to indicate he had in mind
compulsory education through any fixed age beyond a basic education. Indeed,
the Amish communities singularly parallel and reflect many of the virtues of
Jefferson's ideal of the "sturdy yeoman" who would form the basis of what he
considered as the ideal of a democratic society. 284

The Amish had earned a privilege on the basis of their corporate claim
to be anterior to the State, 285 as well as on the basis of their ability to tum
out the kind of individual who had created the United States. Here we
see that the protection of the individual and that of the group are not so
far apart as we might think, and the Court inadvertently summed up
much of its thinking on corporate rights when it observed that "[t]he
child is not the mere creature of the State. " 286
Even more clearly than in Pierce, the claim in Yoder was vindicated
because it was brought on behalf of communities whose existence went
back beyond the United States.
Additionally, the communities
possessed the American virtue of a capacity for hard work and
demonstrated their "sociability" via their commercial activities. The
Court made it clear that similar exemptions would not be available to
individuals who simply rejected "the contemporary secular values
accepted by the majority,""' and that "the very concept of ordered
liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on
The Amish alternative to formal secondary school education has enabled them
to function effectively in their day-to-day life under self-imposed limitations
on relations with the world, and to survive and prosper in contemporary
society as a separate, sharply identifiable and highly self-sufficient community
for more than 200 years in this country.
Id. at 225.
283. 'There is nothing in this record to suggest that the Amish qualities of
reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work would fail to find ready markets in
today's society." Id. at 224.
284. Id. at 225-26.
285. According to the Court:
Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a
long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society,
the Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their
religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital
role that belief and daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order
Amish communities and their religious organization, and the hazards presented
by the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others.
Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
286. Id. at 233 (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 5IO, 535 (1925)).
287. Id. at 216.
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matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important
interests.""' Further, the Court was satisfied that the desire of the Amish
to be exempted from a public education requirement was "not merely a
matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction,
289
shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living."
Like the Society of Sisters, the Amish were members of an ancient and
organized religion that demonstrated its sociability and self-sufficiency
in a way of life that blended both morality and economy.
What is the difference between the situation presented in Pierce and
Yoder, and of that in Smith? It cannot be explained by a simple
reference to a hybrid right, without further reference to the character of
that right. In Pierce and Yoder the plaintiffs were societies that
dedicated their own property to maintaining a way of life-a way of life
separate from but compatible with American ways. By contrast, the
plaintiffs in Smith represented corporate interests of a kind long believed
to be incompatible with the "American" way of life and long
marginalized, largely because the Indian tribes have been perceived to
hold their property communally rather than privately. 29° Further, the
property at issue in Smith, state unemployment benefits, belonged in the
first instance to the government rather than to the plaintiffs.
This point, implicit in Smith, is made much more clearly in Lyng v.
291
Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass'n, another case involving a
Free Exercise claim made on behalf of tribes."' Here the Court
determined that the United States could build a road through land that
was held sacred by a number of tribes without violating their Free
Exercise rights."' The opinion comes down to the bare fact that the
Indians could not claim a Free Exercise violation because they did not
own the lands in question."' As Justice O'Connor put it, "Whatever
Id. at 215-16.
Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
For a systematic account of the centuries-old story of the desire of English
colonists, and then Anglo-Americans, to transform (i.e., destroy) Indian society via the
introduction of private property, see generally Liam Seamus O'Melinn, The Imperial
Origins of Federal Indian Law: The Ideology of Coloniwtion in Britain, Ireland, and
America, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1207 (1999).
291. 485 U.S. 439 (I 988).
292. This is one of the cases presented by Soifer to demonstrate that the legal
system has not adequately recognized the group personality of the Indian tribes. See
SOIFER, supra note 7, at 84-85.
293. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451-53.
294. See id. at 453.
288.
289.
290.
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rights the Indians may have to the use of the area ... do not divest the
Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land." 29' She might
well have gone on, had the history of church incorporation suggested
itself to her, to note that American law had formed a longstanding habit
of vindicating religious claims most enthusiastically when those claims
were made within familiar bounds of property law.
As Pierce and Yoder make clear, the exemptions claimed in both
Smith and Lyng are generally reserved for societies that are both
independent, in the sense of being self-sufficient, and compatible with
American society, in the sense that they have a product to exchange with
the broader society. They are not extended in the fullest sense to
societies whose ways seem to the courts to be fundamentally
incompatible with the rules of American civil society, or to individuals.
Although the language of the law often makes it seem that the strongest
claim is that of the property-holding individual, these cases argue that it
is the property-holding society that receives the greatest favor. Indeed,
given the church cases, it becomes obvious that even though the interest
that is being defended is stated in terms of property rights held by
296
individuals, what is really being defended is a way of life of a group.
C.

Sovereign Endorsement and Involuntary Association

If it is incorrect, then, to argue that the legal system is preoccupied
with the rights of the individual at the expense of the group, what is the
source of the charge of individualism that is made by so many critics?
There are two closely-related sources: a reluctance on the part of the
government to endorse the chosen activities of groups, and a similar
hesitancy to group people against their will. By the same token, as the
religion cases suggest, when groups are identified as voluntary in their
composition and have dedicated property to their chosen pursuits, then
they may well qualify for special favor from the government. In fact,
the relevance of the religion cases becomes much clearer as we see that
in some respects the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment are adjudicated in a similar fashion to the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Two
cases known for their individualism help to make these points: Regents
295. Id.
296. Garvey urges us to recognize that in cases involving property, the Court often
protects the right of the group rather than the individual:
Look now at a very different kind of explanation for the Court's behavior
in this area. It is this: the freedom that the law seeks to protect is not the
freedom of individual church members but the freedom of churches as groups.
The group is a legal and moral person distinct from its members ....
GARVEY, supra note 15, at 146-47.
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of the University v. Bakke'" and Shaw v. Reno."'
Bakke is another case that is widely misunderstood solely as an
instance of the preoccupation of American law with the rights of the
individual. Yet it is a case in which the Court highlighted the odd way
that the conflicting claims of government, social groups, and individuals
were to be mediated according to the demands of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
To begin with, Bakke shows hostility not to groups as such, or to
claims made on behalf of groups, but to attempts by the government to
assign people to groups-to operate on the basis of what equal
protection analysis usually refers to as a "suspect classification." Critics
have noted Bakke's insistence that government owed protection to the
individual, but have not paid enough attention to the mode of analysis,
which focuses more on the anti-grouping principle than on the
individual. 299 The Constitution, wrote Justice Powell, did not allow the
government to create groups based on "color, ethnic origin, or condition
of prior servitude."300 To do so would be to impose a divide in an
arbitrary fashion, distorting social fact with governmental fiction.' 01
Shaw makes the point in a different way, emphasizing the connection
between sovereign endorsement and involuntary grouping. Consider the
most important passage in the case:
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to
the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and
political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but
the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political
apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial groupregardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which
they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the
same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as
impermissible racial stereotypes. 302

This line of thought, to which the Court is adhering quite strictly,
297. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
298. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
299. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289. "It is settled beyond question that the 'rights
created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to
the individual. The rights established are personal rights."' Id. at 289 (quoting Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 22 (1948)).
300. Id. at 293.
301. See id. at 295. "[T]he white 'majority' itself is composed of various minority
groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of
the State and private individuals." Id.
302. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
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amounts to a prohibition of government endorsements of "such
perceptions."
The Court is forbidding endorsements by the government that imply
people share the same interests because they are of the same race. Thus,
Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi have come much nearer the mark in
explaining Shaw than have other scholars; in their view, Shaw signifies a
concern on the part of the Court for "[e]xpressive harms" that is "in
general, social rather than individual." 303 These expressive harms are
notable not for the injuries they inflict on individuals but for "the way in
which they undermine collective understandings."'04
It would still be more accurate to say that Shaw is concerned with
preventing expressive harms through which the government assigns
people to groups on the basis of race. Justice O'Connor is concerned
with de jure social harms alone. This echoes the constraint that Bakke
places upon the government, on the theory that endorsement is harmful
because it creates a class on the basis of race.
In this respect Shaw is merely the flip side of the American rule on
group-protection. The law will recognize groups that are clearly the
result of voluntary association and will even favor them, but it will not
create them itself. The body of jurisprudence that results is suspiciously
similar to concerns over endorsement found in First Amendment law.
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that this similarity derives not from an
American tradition of individualism, but from one of corporatism.
Indeed, this devotion to corporatism is evident in another feature of
the Bakke opinion that is not observed by many commentators: the
nature of its defense of diversity. In addition to stating the anti-grouping
principle as a prohibition imposed on the government, the case
represents an extraordinary statement on the ability of groups to
prescribe and follow their own agendas. Whereas government action
undertaken on the basis of racial classification is suspect, a university's
right to determine its own mission and to set appropriate standards of
admission can allow some consideration of race. In effect, Justice
Powell alerted the University of California that insofar as it behaves as a
private institution in the business of providing education, it can forget
that it is also an arm of the government. A "diverse student body,"
wrote Justice Powell, is "clearly ... a constitutionally permissible goal
for an institution of higher education."'0' What government could not do
according to the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, universities303. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Hanns, "Bimrre
Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after Shaw v.
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483,507 (1993).
304. Id.
305. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
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corporations of academics-could do in the name of the academic
freedom guaranteed them by the First Amendment.")6 They were, in
other words, free to define their own purposes, even when the
government might not avail itself of the same means.
The resulting jurisprudence establishes an academic freedom-a First
Amendment freedom-that can be exercised only by a privileged group.
In appreciating the character of this freedom, it is essential to observe
that the privilege does not belong to those who would be the immediate
beneficiaries of diversity-based admissions, i.e., applicants drawn from
minority groups. It belongs to the people who set the university's
agenda, the corporators, and it can only be exercised by people who are
actually in a position to receive enough applications to make selection of
a diverse student body possible to begin with.
Thus, the Bakke rule on diversity can be stated as a property right,
particularly if property is understood in terms of propriety. As scholars
such as Carol Rose and Gregory Alexander have argued, there is a
distinction between property considered "as an engine for the
maximization of preference satisfactions" and "property as propriety, as
the foundation of decency and good order."307 In this case the University
is told that it can act within its own sphere, to engage in such acts as are
appropriate to its mission and such as are necessary to order its affairs.
It is also told that it cannot go beyond its own bounds, for instance, to
take care of business that more properly belongs to the federal or state
government. This is a property claim based on the propriety of the
chosen means considered in relation to a corporate purpose. The tacit
message of the Court is that the University gets to make its own rules,
even though some of them might be impermissible when employed by a
government actor.'0'
It may seem anomalous that an equal protection argument on behalf of
diversity should fail while a similar First Amendment claim should
306. See id.
307. ROSE, supra note 236, at 64. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 236, at
194-203.
308. This rule, that an entity may not go beyond its own proper bounds in racial
matters, is repeated in a long line of cases, and notably in City of Richmond v. Croson,
488 U.S. 469 (1989), in which the Court ruled that while Richmond might adopt raceconscious means to remedy either discrimination in which the city itself had engaged, or
discrimination occuning within its bounds, it had no authority to adopt such means to
remedy discrimination that had occurred outside its borders: "Nothing we say today
precludes a state or local entity from taking action to rectify the effects of identified
discrimination within its jurisdiction." Id. at 509.
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succeed, but this strange conversion is a testament to the hold that the
corporation has on the American legal mind. Nor is this kind of thinking
restricted to Bakke and Shaw; there are other cases suggesting
convergence between religion and equal protection cases. Justice
O'Connor's reasoning in Shaw is quite similar to the reasoning in her
concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly,"" in which she expressed the Lemon310
establishment test simply in terms of endorsement.' 11 Moreover, Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in Board of Education v. Grumet,'1' which reads
as if it addressed the same issue as Shaw, noted a close similarity
between equal protection and First Amendment analysis. Government,
he wrote,
may not use religion as a criterion to draw political or electoral lines. Whether
or not the purpose is accommodation and whether or not the government
provides similar gerrymanders to people of all religious faiths, the
Establishment Clause forbids the government to use religion as a line-drawing
criterion. In this respect, the Establishment Clause mirrors the Equal Protection
Clause. Just as the government may not segregate people on account of their
race, so too it may not segregate people on the basis of religion. 313

In attempting to understand this seeming confusion of legal categories
more fully, it is tempting to wonder what the Court is worried about. In
the area of race-conscious redistricting, that is a difficult question to
answer if we think in terms of the individual. As critics of Shaw have
pointed out, it is difficult to see what the injury to any individual
plaintiff actually was."•
309. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
310. The Lemon test has emerged from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
311. Thus, although she would have applied a two-prong test, each prong concerned
itself exclusively with the issue of endorsement. Justice O'Connor insisted that the
"central issue in this case is whether [the City] has endorsed Christianity by its display of
the creche. To answer that question, we must examine both what [the City] intended to
communicate in displaying the creche and what message the City's display actually
conveyed." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.
312. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
313. Id. at 728. This Article does not mean to assert here that there is a simple
congruence between the two lines of analysis, so as to suggest either that a majority of
the Court treats establishment and equal protection the same way, or that adoption of the
endorsement test forecasts the way an individual Justice will vote in a particular case.
Thus, although it is noted that Abner Greene and Ira Lupu have debated this issue, this
Article does not attempt to decide that debate. See Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and
Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 Cot.UM. L. REv. 1, 27-51 (1996) (arguing for a
connection between race and religion); Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the Village of Kiryas
Joel, 96 Cot.UM. L. REV. 104, 113-20 (1996) (arguing against the connection).
However, this Article does intend to point out that sensitivity to language regarding
voluntary and involuntary grouping, rather than to language regarding individual rights,
argues that there is some connection between race and religion in the minds of some of
the members of the Court.
314. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 266, at 2288 ("The preceding discussion
suggests two things. First, a coherent concept of standing grows out of a clear definition

162

[VOL. 37: IOI, 2000]

Corporation in American Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

In this setting, the injury is better understood in terms of a
commitment to honoring the group that is voluntarily assembled and that
has come to court to vindicate the use of its property. It must also be
understood in terms of a tradition holding that the government takes its
instructions from its corporate constituents. Considered in this light, the
injury would appear to be found in a departure from a traditional
American rule regarding sovereign authorship--the endorsement is the
departure and this departure inflicts harm per se.
The comparison with France helps to make this point clearer. The
Court's fear is that the government will wind up like the author of
Rousseau's plays, as a sovereign author that shapes its constituents and
constituencies to its will.' 1' To Rousseau's central question-"Will they
form us or will we form them?"' 16-the Court's answer is that they (the
constituents) will form us (the government). In giving this answer the
Court has remained consistent with its decision in Pierce. Oregon had
defended its attack on private schools as an effort to remold its
constituents in order to produce a uniform citizenry that integrated the
diverse elements of American society in one body politic.' 1' The brief
for the Society of Sisters quoted an official pamphlet explaining
Oregon's law in terms of such integration: "Mix the children of the
foreign-born with the native-born, the rich with the poor. Mix those
with prejudices in the public school melting pot for a few years while
their minds are plastic, and finally bring out the finished product-a true
American.""'
By rejecting this argument, the Court appears to have accepted the
Society of Sisters' claim that Oregon's plan bore a "ruthless and even
cruel implication which is subversive of American ideals of home and
parental authority. If the children, against the will of their parents, are to
be 'mixed' by legislative mandate, it is difficult to perceive where this
sort of legislation will end."' 1' Moreover, as Barbara Woodhouse notes,
the Oregon measure was understood not merely as an intrusion on the
of the relevant injury. Second, the Supreme Court has failed to articulate any theory of
injury that coherently accounts for the standing rule it has produced.").
315. See supra Part II.B.
316. ROUSSEAU, supra note 70, at 119 (emphasis added).
317. See Brief on Behalf of Appellee, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (No. 583), in 23 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 259, 306-07 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard

Casper eds., 1975).
318. Id. at 307.
319.

Id.
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family but on the rights of the institutions that formed the basis of
American society as well."0 It was
an assault on a certain way of life. As the brief for Society of Sisters pointed
out: "If the state can thus destroy the primary school, it can destroy the
secondary school, the college and the university. Harvard, Yale, Columbia,
Princeton . . . [a]ll could be swept away, and with them would depart an
influence and an inspiration that this country can ill afford to lose." 321

In choosing between the right of the State to shape its constituents in
order to integrate them, and the right of the private institution to live
according to its own ways, the Court, then as now, endorsed the rights of
the constituent over those of the sovereign author.

VIL

CONCLUSION

As this Article's analysis suggests, critics of the Court have reason to
complain. Is it appropriate to treat people without either property or
privilege as if they had both? Is it sensible to treat race-redistricting
cases-in which minority group members are seeking greater inclusion
in the political order-in the same fashion as free exercise and
establishment cases-in which group members are seeking exemption
from some requirement of the political order? The traditional answers to
these questions are, at the very least, problematic. And that is precisely
the reason why many critics of American law look to Rousseau as a
guide. His insistence that the truest body politic was an indivisible
people is certainly compatible with the desire to achieve complete
inclusion in the people of the United States.
Yet Rousseau is not available to us. The direct and absolute
relationship between the individual and the sovereign state, on which his
republicanism was premised, is foreign to American republicanism. The
American people have been divided and subdivided so many times that
their true nature seems to lie in di vision rather than in unity. It is thus
difficult to speak of the American people as if it were one body. In
addition, however desirable sovereign authorship may be, the theory that
underlies it has never really taken root in the United States and is
unlikely to do so in the near future. The government is not in the habit
of assembling groups; it is in the habit of receiving instructions from
them. The tragedy is not that American law has too little room for
groups, but that it has too much room for the group that has come
together of its own volition and put property to certain uses.
The challenge is not to teach the Court how to speak the language of
320.
321.
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Rousseau-although that would be a trick-but to find a tenable way to
vindicate the claims of groups that diverge in important ways from those
traditionally honored by American law. In seeking to protect groups that
have historically been underprivileged, the challenge is to find new ways
to demonstrate that interests are voluntarily shared and affiliations
voluntarily entered into.
When faced with the individual who neither belongs to an approved
group nor has property to devote to a cause, American law has long
given the same answer: Go and associate with others so as to become a
bigger person, a corporate person. This answer, which has proved
satisfactory in areas such as religion, has proved less so in others. It is
not an adequate answer, and we will never find one as long as we insist
that the problem with American law is that it pays too much attention to
the rights of the individual.
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